战略偶尔进行采访; these are always in the subscriber-only Daily Update, in part as a benefit for subscribers, but also because Weekly Articles are more representative of what potential subscribers should expect if they choose to receive每日更新。
我对这条推文感到后悔，不仅仅是因为“在188足球比分直播网上打气”总是冒险回来当Stratechery开始我写第一篇文章that one of the topics I looked forward to exploring was “Why Wall Street is not completely insane”; I was thinking at the time about Apple, a company that, especially at that time, was regularly posting eye-popping revenue and profit numbers that did not necessarily lead to corresponding increases in the stock price, much to the consternation of Apple shareholdersThe underlying point should be an obvious one: a stock price is about future earnings, not already realized ones; that the iPhone maker had just had a great quarter was an important signal about the future, but not a determinant factor, and that those pointing to the past to complain about a price predicated on the future were missing the point.
不过,值得注意的是,虽然这些苹果股东的显式的推理可能是嫌疑人,他们的观点被证明是正确的:2013年4月Apple报道quarterly revenue of $43.6 billion and profit of $9.5 billion, and the day I started Stratechery the stock price was $63.25; five years laterApple报道季度收入为611亿美元，利润为138亿美元，周五股价为190.98美元。
The question is if a similar case can be made for Facebook: certainly my tweet taken literally was naive for the exact reasons those Apple investor complaints missed the point five years ago; what about the sentiment, though? Just how good of a business is Facebook?
正如盈利的情况一样，Facebook股票的走势只是关于结果以及未来预期的全部结果On Wednesday, Facebook’s stock closed at $217, but then its earnings showed revenue of $13.2 billion, slightly below Wall Street’s expectations; unsurprisingly, the stock slid about 8% in after-hours trading to around $200两条评论激发了真正的下跌在收益电话会议上来自Facebook首席财务官Dave Wehner关于Facebook未来的期望。
Turning now to the revenue outlook; our total revenue growth rate decelerated approximately 7 percentage points in Q2 compared to Q1我们的总收入增长率将在2018年下半年继续减速，我们预计第三季度和第四季度的收入增长率将比前几个季度的高个位数下降。
Turning now to expenses; we continue to expect that full-year 2018 total expenses will grow in the range of 50% to 60% compared to last year…Looking beyond 2018, we anticipate that total expense growth will exceed revenue growth in 2019在接下来的几年中，我们预计我们的营业利润率将以百分比的形式趋向30年代中期。
从纯粹的财务角度来看，这两条新闻都不太理想，但至少可以理解In terms of revenue, Facebook’s growth is from a very large base, which means that this quarter’s 42% year-over-year revenue growth to $13.2 billion from $9.3 billion is, in absolute terms, 36% greater than the year ago’s 45% revenue growth (from $6.4 billion)To put it in simpler terms, massive growth rates inevitably decline even as massive absolute growth remains; as a point of comparison, Google in the same relative timeframe (14 years after incorporation) grew 35 percent to $12.21 billion (i.eFacebook在两个指标上都更好）。
至于经营利润率的下降，在一个正常的公司 - 即一个边际成本 - 收入减少不一定会导致保证金有意义的下降，因为减少产品销售意味着降低销售成本当然，Facebook不是一个普通的公司：他们销售的广告的唯一边际成本是信用卡费用;像大多数科技公司一样the vast majority of costs are “below the line” (mostly in Research & Development, but also Sales & Marketing and General & Administrative); it follows, then, that a decrease in revenue growth would, absent an explicit effort to decrease unrelated (to revenue) expense growth, lead to lower operating margins.
In fact, Facebook is not only not decreasing expenses, they are going in the opposite direction; expenses are growing faster than ever, even as revenue growth clearly fell off:
I suspect it is this chart, more than anything else, that explains the drop in Facebook’s stock price: it’s not one thing or the other; it is both revenue growth slowing and expenses accelerating at the same time, with all indications from management are that the trends will continue.
Again, relatively speaking Facebook is in great shape financially — I already noted the company had better revenue and growth numbers than Google at a similar point, and their operating margins are substantially better as well — but there’s no question this is a pretty substantial shift in the company’s longterm outlook金融镜头仍然提供了一个非常积极的观点，但它确实比以前更不积极。
关于Facebook的写作总是有点混乱，因为Facebook公司和Facebook都是产品，毫无疑问，多年来，最大量的消极性一直围绕着后者。To that end, it is tempting to conflate the two; for example, the New York Times wrote in an article headlinedFacebook开始为丑闻付出代价：
近两年,Facebook已经出现防弹尽管一系列丑闻的滥用其庞大的社交网络但硅谷公司的连胜在周三结束时表示，问题的积累已开始损害其数十亿美元的业务 - 并且成本将持续数月持续。
This is true as far as it goes, particular when it comes to expenses: Facebook is on pace to increase its security and content review teams to 20,000 people, a three-fold increase in 18 months; that is why CEO Mark Zuckerberg去年在财报电话会上发出警告：
- 广告加载(News Feed)所示的广告数量增加
A year ago, though, Facebook stopped increasing ad load; as我有记录,这也导致了更加严重的per-ad增加价格,但这仍是一种阻燃在增长。
然后，在过去一年中，Facebook的用户增长开始放缓，并且在利润最高的北美地区，已经有效稳定That, though, isn’t because of Facebook’s controversies: it is because the app has run out of people! The company has 241 million monthly active users in the US & Canada, 65% of the total population of 372 million (including children who aren’t supposed to have accounts before the age of 13).
考虑到几乎完全渗透的程度，在评估Facebook的健康状况时更重要的是没有迹象表明该公司正在失去用户Sure, the numbers in North America decreased by a million in Q4 2017, but now that million is back; I expect something similar when it comes to the million users the company lost in Europe when it required affirmative consent from users to continue using the app because of GDPR.
The fact of the matter is that nothing has happened to diminish Facebook’s moat when it comes to attracting and retaining users: the number one feature of a social network is how many people are on it, and for all intents and purposes everyone is on Facebook — whether they like it or not.
扎克伯格指的是他的2017年宣言建立全球社区; it is a particularly attractive goal from Facebook’s perspective because it makes the product stickier than ever.
所有这一切，通过该公司产品的镜头观看Facebook的最重要原因是Facebook的应用程序的庞大规模使得很容易失去其他产品的仍然可观的增长潜力的网站特别是Instagramrecently passed 1 billion users, which is an incredible number that is still less than half of Facebook the app’s total users; by definition Instagram has reached less than half of its addressable market.
此外,Instagram不仅一直没有被Facebook的争议,它是这样一个令人信服的产品,据坊间传言说,大多数“Facebook-nevers”或“Facebook-quitters”欣然承认每天使用这项服务该应用程序还没有接近实现其货币化潜力：虽然Feed具有与Facebook相同的广告负载，但是SnapChat灵感的故事格式that has exploded in usage has barely been monetized; in fact, Facebook’s executives attributed some of the company’s slowing revenue growth to increased Stories usage (instead of the feed)从纯粹的财务角度来看，这无疑是令人担忧的问题，但从战略角度来看，这意味着Instagram处于一个更加强大的地位请记住，收入和利润都是落后的指标，Instagram故事的爆炸式增长是一个极端的例子，说明为什么要记住这一重要事实。
This lens takes the exact opposite perspective of Lens 2; looking at the company from a product perspective shows four different apps, but looking at the company from an advertising perspective shows a single integrated machine.
Zuckerberg and Sandberg were obviously talking about the potential for advertising in Stories, but that potential is simply a repeat of what has already happened with Feed ads: Facebook spent years building out News Feed advertising — not simply the display and targeting technology but also the entire back-end apparatus for advertisers, connections with non-Facebook data sources and points-of-sale, relationships with ad buyers, etc- 然后简单地将Instagram插入该基础设施。
但最大的影响是潜在的竞争很有可能专注于“投资回报率”中的“R” - 投资回报 - 正如我刚才注意到的Instagram + Facebook使其更具吸引力Just as important, though, is the “I”; there is tremendous benefit to being a one-stop shop for advertisers, who can save time and money by focusing their spend on FacebookThe tools are familiar, the buys are made across platforms, and as Zuckerberg and Sandberg alluded to with regard to Stories, the ads themselves only need to be made once to be used across multiple platforms为什么甚至在其他地方做广告呢？
The first is GDPR; this may seem counter-intuitive, given that Facebook said last week the regulation cost them a million users, and that one of the factors that would hurt revenue growth was the increased controls the company was giving users when it comes to controlling their personal information但是记住,GDPR适用于每个人,不仅仅是Facebook,桑德伯格指出在调用(强调我的）：
While GDPR advocates have pointed to the lobbying Google and Facebook have done against the law as evidence that it will be effective, that is to completely miss the point: of course neither company wants to incur the costs entailed in such significant regulation, which will absolutely restrict the amount of information they can collect遗漏的是，数字广告的增长是一个长期趋势，首先是眼球：在手机上花费的时间越来越多，广告收入将不可避免地随之而来The calculation that matters, then, is not how much Google or Facebook are hurt in isolation, but how much they are hurt relatively to their competitors, and the obvious answer is “a lot less”, which, in the context of that secular increase, means growth.
Secondly, all of those costs that Facebook are incurring for security and content review that are reducing operating margin? Perhaps the stock market would feel better if they were characterized as moat expansion, because that’s exactly what they are: any would-be Facebook competitor is going to have to make a similar investment, and do it from a dramatically lower revenue base.
More broadly, our strategy is to use Facebook’s computing infrastructure, business platforms and security systems to serve people across all of our apps…We’re using AI systems in our global community operations team to fight spam, harassment, hate speech, and terrorism across all of our apps to keep people safe这对于像WhatsApp和Instagram这样的应用来说非常有用，因为它可以帮助我们更有效地应对超高速增长的挑战。
This is why the lens with which you view Facebook matters so much: the exact same set of facts viewed from a financial perspective are a clear negative; from a moat perspective they are a clear positive.
我很喜欢说很少有公司像Facebook一样被低估，特别是在硅谷Admittedly, it seems strange to say such a thing about a $245 billion company with a trailing 12-month P/E ratio of 88, but that is Wall Street sentiment; in the tech bubble many seem to simply assume the company is ever on the brink of teetering “just like MySpace”, never mind the fact that the social network pioneer barely broke 100 million registered users, less than 10% of the number of active users Facebook attracted in a single day late last month或者，正如更清醒的头脑可能会争辩的那样，Facebook今天看起来势不可挡，但十年前谷歌看起来势不可挡，当时社交似乎无处不在：肯定Facebook杀手迫在眉睫！
事实上，它存在的原因在于它存在的原因：Facebook开始在扎克伯格的哈佛宿舍里通过完全数字化已经存在的离线关系，无论是在现实生活中还是在实际的物理“脸书”中Facebook是如此强大，因为它与现实世界的直接联系：它是浅薄的，有点恶意，有时是恶意的 - 是的，往往是好的 - 因为我们人类是浅薄的，有点恶意，有时是恶意的 - 是的，往往是好的。
By extension, to insist that Facebook will die any day now is in some respects to suggest that humanity will cease to exist any day now; granted, it is a company and companies fail, but even if Facebook failed it would only be a matter of time before another Facebook rose to replace it.
That seems unlikely: for all of the company’s travails and controversies over the past few years, its moats are deeper than ever, its money-making potential not only huge but growing both internally and secularly; to that end, what is perhaps most distressing of all to would-be competitors is in fact this quarter’s results: at the end of the day Facebook took a massive hit通过选择; the company is not maximizing the short-term, it is spending the money and suppressing its revenue potential in favor of becoming more impenetrable than ever.
要了解谷歌如何以43亿欧元的罚款和90天的最后期限来改变其围绕Android的业务实践，关键是要记住一个日期：2005年7月。1那时谷歌收购了一款名为Android的仍处于开发阶段的移动操作系统，并将收购置于背景中，史蒂夫·乔布斯是，至少在公开场合，“不相信人们想在一个小小的屏幕上看电影”He was, of course, referring to the iPod; Apple would go on to release an iPod with video playback a few months later, but the iPhone was still a year-and-a-half away from being revealed.
换句话说，Android，至少在开始时，并不是对Apple的回应;2真正的目标是微软（以及较小程度上的黑莓手机），它似乎有望像智能手机一样掌控智能手机That was an untenable situation for Google; then Vice-President of Product Management Sundar Pichai wrote在Google Public Policy博客上关于公司在PC上面临的挑战：
谷歌认为，浏览器市场仍然在很大程度上没有竞争力，这阻碍了用户的创新This is because Internet Explorer is tied to Microsoft’s dominant computer operating system, giving it an unfair advantage over other browsersCompare this to the mobile market, where Microsoft cannot tie Internet Explorer to a dominant operating system, and its browser therefore has a much lower usage.
对谷歌来说最重要的是对最终用户的访问：这才是最终用户的利益聚合飞轮转在个人电脑上，公司通过更好的结合使用成功，访问新网址（并将其设为主页）非常简单，并与OEM合作，从一开始就将Google设置为主页All would be more difficult to achieve on mobile, at least mobile as it was understood in 2005: applications were notoriously difficult to find and install, and Microsoft and Blackberry had locked down their operating systems to a much greater extent than Microsoft had on the PC.
因此Android开局：谷歌决定直接在移动操作系统上采用微软，其最强大的工具不会是操作系统的质量，而是商业模式为此，Google自然而然地做到了重新安装Android的用户界面once the iPhone was announced, the business model remained Microsoft kryptonite: whereas Microsoft charged a per-device licensing fee, just as it had with Windows, Android would not only be free and open-source, Google would actually share search revenue derived from Android with OEMs that installed the operating system.
Of course Android also ended up being a much better experience than Windows Mobile in the post-iPhone world, and the deal was irresistible to OEMs flailing for a response to the iPhone: get a (somewhat) comparable (sort-of) touch-based operating system for free, and even make money after the initial sale! Indeed, not only did Android effectively kill Microsoft’s mobile efforts, it went on to take over the world via a massive ecosystem of device makers and mobile carriers that competed to drive down costs and increase distribution.
Android增加竞争是Pichai的焦点 - 现在是Google的首席执行官 -最新博文作出回应：
今天，欧盟委员会发布了针对Android及其商业模式的竞争决定该决定忽略了Android手机与iOS手机竞争的事实，89％的受访者对委员会自己的市场调查证实了这一点It also misses just how much choice Android provides to thousands of phone makers and mobile network operators who build and sell Android devices; to millions of app developers around the world who have built their businesses with Android; and billions of consumers who can now afford and use cutting-edge Android smartphones今天，由于Android，有超过24,000台设备，每个价位，来自1,300多个不同的品牌......
就此而言，Android以及Chrome和Chrome OS并不是典型商业意义上的“产品”他们没有计划成为他们自己的“经济城堡”。相反，他们是非常昂贵和非常具有攻击性的“护城河”，由谷歌城堡的高度和大小[（搜索广告）]资助谷歌的目标是防御而不是冒犯他们并不是想在Android或Chrome上赚钱他们想要在他们自己和消费者之间生活任何一层并使其免费（甚至不到免费）因为这些层基本上是没有可变成本的软件产品，所以这是一种非常可行的防御策略In essence, they are not just building a moat; Google is also scorching the earth for 250 miles around the outside of the castle to ensure no one can approach it最好的我可以说，他们做得很好。
Indeed they were, but the strategy had a built-in problem: Android was, well, open source, and just as that helped Android spread, it could just as easily be forked into an initially compatible operating system that didn’t connect to Google’s services — the castle that Google was trying to protect all along谷歌为护城河需要一堵墙，并在Google Play商店中找到了一面墙。
Google Play商店和Google Play服务
但请注意，Play商店是不Android的一部分：它一直是Google的Android版本的封闭源代码，与Gmail，地图和YouTube等其他Google服务一样然而，谷歌对所有这些应用程序的问题在于，它们是使用操作系统进行更新的，而OEM和运营商 - 在设备最初售出时只赚钱 - 并没有特别鼓励更新操作系统。
Google’s solution was Google Play Services; first released in 2010 as a part of Android 2.2 Froyo, Google Play Services was distributed via the Play Store and provided an easily updatable API layer that would, in the initial version, allow Google to update its own apps independent of operating system updates这是一个优雅的解决方案，解决了Google为Android发布所采用的免费模式所固有的真正问题：广泛的碎片化很快所有谷歌的应用程序是建立在谷歌播放服务,然后,在2012年,谷歌开始开放给开发商。
The initial version was quite modest; here is the在Google+上发布公告：
在谷歌I / O我们宣布一个预览的谷歌服务,一个新的发展平台,开发人员想要将谷歌服务整合到他们的应用程序今天，我们开始全面推出Google Play服务v1.0，其中包括Google+ API和新的OAuth 2.0功能该部署将涵盖运行最新版Google Play商店的Android 2.2+设备上的所有用户。
Over the next several years, though, Google devoted more and more of its effort — and its most interesting APIs, like location and maps and gaming services — to Google Play Services; meanwhile, whatever equivalent service was in the open-source version of Android was effectively frozen in timeThe net result is incredibly significant to teasing out this case: Google Play Services silently shifted ever more apps from Android apps to Google Play apps; today, no Google app will function on open-source Android without extensive reworking, and the same applies to ever more 3rd-party apps as well.
- Illegally tying Google’s search and browser apps to the Google Play Store; to get the Google Play Store and thus a full complement of apps, OEMs have to pre-install Google search and Chrome and make them available within one screen of the home page.
- The Google Play Store has always been an exclusive Google app; it seems that Google ought to be able to distribute it exclusively as part of a bundle if it so chooses.
- Pinning all revenue from Google Search to exclusivity on all devices quite obviously makes it very difficult for alternative search services to build share (as they lack access to pre-installs, one of the most effective channels for customer acquisition); this seems to be more of a Google Search dominance issue than an Android dominance issue though.
- 预测OEM上的任何Google应用程序（包括Google Play商店）的可用性不利用开放源码特性将不包括谷歌的Android设备上应用似乎更多的问题比谷歌坚称其应用是分布在一个包The latter is Google’s prerogative; the former is dictating OEM actions just because Google can.
This is where the history of Android matters; before Google Play Services, the primary challenge in building a competitive fork of Android would have been convincing developers to upload their apps to a new app store (since Google would obviously not want to put its apps, including the Play Store, on said fork)然而，这个分支从未实现，因为谷歌的合同条款禁止原始设备制造商销售任何基于这种分支的设备。
Today the situation is very different: that contractual limitation could go away tomorrow (or, more accurately, in 90 days), and it wouldn’t really matter because, as I explained above, many apps are no longer Android apps but are rather Google Play apps在Android fork上运行绝不是不可能的，但大多数都需要更多的返工而不是简单地上传到新的App Store。
In short, in my estimation the real antitrust issue is Google contractually foreclosing OEMs from selling devices with non-Google versions of Android; the only way to undo that harm in 2018, though, would be to make Google Play Services available to any Android fork.
To be sure, that’s not exactly what the European Commission ordered (in fact, “Google Play Services” does not appear a single time in the press release); the Commission seems to feel that the three issues do stand alone这意味着Google必须单独回复每个人：
- Google has to untie the Play Store from Search and the Chrome browser
到目前为止最重要的是第一个（尽管事实上它是最弱的指控，据我估计）三星或任何其他OEM可以在90天内销售仅使用Bing搜索的设备和Google Play商店（当然可以下载Google搜索）This will likely accrue to consumers’ benefit: Microsoft, Google, and other providers will soon be bidding to be the default search option, and, given the commoditized nature of Android devices, it is likely that most of what they are willing to pay will go towards lower prices.
Still, it is an unsatisfying remedy: Google built Android for the express purpose of monetizing search, and to be denied that by regulatory edict feels off; Google, though, bears a lot of the blame for going too far with its contracts.
More broadly, the European Commission continues to be a bit too cavalier about denying companies — well, Google, mostly — the right to monetize the products they spend billions of dollars at significant risk to develop; this was我对去年谷歌购物案的主要反对意见In this case I narrowly come down on the Commission’s side almost by accident: I think Google acted illegally by contractually foreclosing Android competitors at a time when it might have made a difference, but I am concerned that the Commission’s publicly released reasoning doesn’t seem to grasp exactly how Android has developed, the choices Google made, and why.
值得注意的是，我高度怀疑谷歌会采取什么不同的方式：当涉及到公司的目标时，Android无法取得更大的成功 - 如果有的话，这一裁决证明了该产品的成功程度。
When Krzanich was appointed CEO in 2013 it was already clear that arguably the most important company in Silicon Valley’s history was in trouble: PCs, long Intel’s chief money-maker, were in decline, leaving the company ever more reliant on the sale of high-end chips to data centers; Intel had effectively zero presence in mobile, the industry’s other major growth area.
As Bajarin notes, 7nm for TSMC (or Samsung or Global Foundries) isn’t necessarily better than Intel’s 10nm; chip-labeling isn’t what it used to be问题在于，英特尔的10nm工艺并未接近批量发货，竞争对手的7nm工艺也是如此英特尔落后了，它对集成的坚持承担了很大一部分责任。
Intel, like Microsoft, had its fortunes made by IBM: eager to get the PC an increasingly vocal section of its customer base demanded out the door, the mainframe maker outsourced much of the technology to third party vendors, the most important being an operating system from Microsoft and a processor from IntelThe impact of the former decision was the formation of an entire ecosystem centered around MS-DOS, and eventually Windows, cementing Microsoft’s dominance.
Intel was a slightly different story; while an operating system was simply bits on a disk, and thus easily duplicated for all of the PCs IBM would go on to sell, a processor was a physical device that needed to be manufactured为此，IBM坚持拥有“第二个来源”，即第二个非英特尔制造商用于英特尔芯片Intel chose AMD, and licensed first the 8086 and 8088 designs that were in the original IBM PC, and later, again under pressure from IBM, the 80286 design; the latter was particularly important because it was designed to be upward compatible with everything that followed.
这为英特尔未来35年的战略 - 以及巨大的盈利能力 - 奠定了基础首先，英特尔x86设计的主导地位得益于其与DOS / Windows的集成：特别是，DOS / Windows创建了开发人员和PC用户的双边市场，DOS / Windows运行在x86上。
However, thanks to its licensing deal with AMD, Intel wasn’t automatically entitled to all of the profits that would result from that integration; thus Intel doubled-down on an integration of its own: the design and manufacture of x86 chips,英特尔将投入巨额资金,创造新的和更快的设计(386年,486年,奔腾,等等),并投入大量的资金投入到更小和更高效的生产过程,将推动的极限摩尔定律尽管获得了AMD的许可，但这一两次打击将确保英特尔的芯片成为PC制造商唯一的现实选择，使该公司能够获得x86与DOS / Windows集成所产生的绝大部分利润。
英特尔在很大程AMD did take the performance crown around the turn of the century with the Athlon 64, but the company was unable to keep up with Intel financially when it came to fabs, and Intel illegally leveraged its dominant position with OEMs to keep them buying mostly Intel parts; then, a few years later, Intel not only took back the performance lead with its Core architecture, but settled into the “tick-tock” strategy where it alternated new designs and new manufacturing processes on a regular schedule整合优势是真实的。
This was a completely novel idea: at that time all chip manufacturing was integrated a la Intel; the few firms that were only focused on chip design had to scrap for excess capacity at Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs) who were liable to steal designs and cut off production in favor of their own chips if demand rose现在台积电提供了一个更有吸引力的替代品，即使他们的制造能力落后。
然而，随着时间的推移，台积电变得更好，很大程度上是因为它没有选择：很快它的制造能力只落后于行业标准一步，并在十年之内赶上了（尽管英特尔仍然领先于所有人）Meanwhile, the fact that TSMC existed created the conditions for an explosion in “fabless” chip companies that focused on nothing but design例如，在20世纪90年代末期，专注于专用图形芯片的公司出现了爆炸性增长：几乎所有公司都是由台积电制造的而且，一直以来，增加的业务让台积电在制造能力上投入更多。
- 由无晶圆厂设计公司设计的专用芯片越来越多地用于以前属于通用处理器领域的业务特别是图形芯片were well-suited to machine learning, cryptocurrency mining, and other highly “embarrassingly parallel” operations; many of those applications have spawned specialized chips of their own例如，有专门的比特币芯片，或谷歌的Tensor Processing Units：全部由台积电制造。
与此同时，英特尔采用了综合方法第一个主要的失误是移动：而不是简单地为iPhone制造ARM芯片the company presumed it could win by leveraging its manufacturing to create a more-efficient x86 chip; it was a decision that evinced too much knowledge of Intel’s margins and not nearly enough reflection on the importance of the integration between DOS/Windows and x86.
英特尔对非通用处理器采取了同样的错误做法，特别是图形：公司的Larrabee建筑was a graphics chip based on — you guessed it — x86; it was predicated on leveraging Intel’s integration, instead of actually meeting a market need一旦项目可以预见失败英特尔一瘸一拐地随着勉强满足通用显示的图形,和毫无价值的新兴的新用例。
然而，最新的危机是设计：AMD正在使用Ryzen处理器（由GlobalFoundries和台积电制造）进行真正的创新，而英特尔仍在销售Skylake，这是一个已有三年历史的设计Ashraf Eassa, with assistance from a since-deleted tweet from a former Intel engineer,解释发生了什么：
What Piednoel is saying in the tweet I quoted above is that when management had the opportunity to start doing the work to bring their latest processor design, known as Ice Lake (abbreviated “ICL” in the tweet), [to the 14nm process] they decided against doing so这可能是因为管理层两年前真正相信英特尔的10纳米制造技术将在今天投入生产管理层赌注不正确，因此英特尔的产品组合将受到影响。
这一切都在Krzanich和他的前任保罗欧德宁身上Then again, perhaps neither had a choice: what makes disruption so devastating is the fact that, absent a crisis, it is almost impossible to avoidManagers are paid to leverage their advantages, not destroy them; to increase margins, not obliterate them文化更广泛的是一个组织的最大资产，直到它成为一个诅咒要求英特尔为其集成模型道歉在2018年令人满意，但对于它之前35年的成功和利润都不屑一顾。
首先要了解联邦法官批准AT＆T收购时代华纳的决定，以及美国的反对意见Department of Justice, is that it is very much in-line with the status quo: this is a vertical merger, and both the Department of Justice and the courts have defaulted towards approving such mergers for decades.1
Second, that there is an explosion of merger activity in and between the television production and distribution space is hardly a surprise: the Multichannel Video Programming Distributor (MVPD) business — that is, television distributed by cable, broadband, or satellite — has been shrinking for years now, and in a world where the addressable market is decreasing, the only avenues for growth are winning share from competitors, acquiring competitors, or vertically integrating.
Third, that last paragraph overstates the industry’s travails, at least in terms of television distribution, because most TV distributors are also internet service providers (ISPs), which means they are getting paid by consumers using the services disrupting MVPDs, including Netflix, Google, Facebook, and the Internet generally.
对于这个案例而言，令人不惊讶但又奇怪的是它在第二点上的争夺程度，对第三点的认可最少That is, it seems clear to me that AT&T made this acquisition with an eye on point number three, yet the government’s case was predicated on point number two; to that end, the government, in my eyes, rightly lost given the case they made他们是否应该失去一个更好的案件完全是另一个问题。
What is the point of a merger, instead of a contract? This is a question that always looms large in any acquisition, particularly one of this size: AT&T is paying $85 billion for Time Warner, and that’s an awfully steep price to simply hang out with movie stars.
The standard explanation for most mergers is “synergies”, the idea that there are significant cost savings from combining the operations of two companies; the reason this explanation is popular is because saving money is not an issue for antitrust, while the corresponding possibility — charging higher prices by achieving a stronger market position through consolidation — is但是，这种解释通常适用于横向合并的情况，而不是像AT＆T和时代华纳那样的垂直合并。
如果允许这项合并继续进行，新合并的公司可能会 - 正如AT＆T / DirecTV已经预测的那样 - 利用其对时代华纳流行节目的控制作为伤害竞争的武器AT&T/DirecTV would hinder its rivals by forcing them to pay hundreds of millions of dollars more per year for Time Warner’s networks, and it would use its increased power to slow the industry’s transition to new and exciting video distribution models that provide greater choice for consumers拟议的合并将减少美国家庭的创新产品和更高的账单。
这个想法是AT＆T可以利用其对DirecTV的所有权来要求其他MVPD提高Turner网络的价格，因为如果MVPD拒绝付费，客户将被转为DirectTV问题是，很容易计算, this makes no economic sense: the amount of money AT&T would lose by blacking out Turner would almost certainly outweigh whatever gains it might accrue法官同意了，就是这样。
饱和市场的含义是增长越来越零，这为AT＆T带来了问题和机遇The problem is primarily T-Mobile: fueled by the massive break-up fee paid by AT&T for the aforementioned failed acquisition, T-Mobile has embarked on an all-out assault against the incumbent wireless carriers, and AT&T has felt the pain the most, recording a negative net change in postpaid wireless customers for eight straight quarters不能或不愿意与t - mobile在价格上竞争,AT&T需要区分,理想情况下,不仅能避免损失,但实际上导致收益。
乍一看，这并不能解释时代华纳的收购：根据我的观点，上面是两个截然不同的公司，两个截然不同的内容战略观点订户（如AT＆T）的零和竞争分销商有一个垂直的商业模式：理想情况下应该有分销商专有的服务和内容，从而保护客户Time Warner, though, is a content company, which means it has a horizontal business model: content is made once and then monetized across the broadest set of potential customers possible, taking advantage of content’s zero marginal costThe assumption of this sort of horizontal business model underlay Time Warner’s valuation; to suddenly make Time Warner’s content exclusive to AT&T would be massively value destructive (this is a reality often missed by suggestions that Apple, for example, should acquire content companies to differentiate its hardware).
然而，AT＆T可能发现了一个漏洞：零评级Zero rating is often conflated with net neutrality, but unlike the latter, zero rating does not entail the discriminatory treatment of data; it just means that some data is free (sure, this is a violation of the的想法净中立，但这就是原因我很关键网络中立倡导者对数据的歧视性处理的狭隘关注AT＆T是已经使用零评级来推动DirecTV：
This is almost certainly the plan for Time Warner content as well: sure, it will continue to be available on all distributors, but if you subscribe to AT&T you can watch as much as you want for free; moreover, this offering is one that is strengthened by secular trends towards cord-cutting and mobile-only video consumption如果这些趋势继续沿着他们目前的方向发展，AT＆T不仅会加强其针对T-Mobile的无线服务护城河，甚至可能开始抢占市场份额。
他指出，很奇怪为什么司法部起诉阻止这次收购：特朗普总统非常直言不讳地反对这项协议，甚至更直言不讳地反对他对时代华纳拥有的CNN的反感与此同时，领导此案的反托拉斯特助理检察长Makan Delrahim，没看到合并的问题在他被任命之前That the government’s complaint rested on both the most obvious angle and, from AT&T’s perspective, the least important, suggests a paucity of rigor in the prosecution of this case; it is very reasonable to wonder if the order to oppose the merger came from the top, and that the easiest case was the obvious out.
Thus we are in the unfortunate scenario where a bad case by the government has led to, at best, a merger that was never examined for its truly anti-competitive elements, and at worst, bad law that will open the door for similar tie-upsTo be sure, it is not at all clear that the government would have won had they focused on zero rating: there is an obvious consumer benefit to the concept — that is why T-Mobile leveraged it to such great effect! — and the burden would have been on the government to show that the harm was greater.
显然需要的是新的立法，而不是试图以一种简单可逆的方式误用古代监管Moreover, AT&T has a point that online services like Google and Facebook are legitimate competitors, particularly for ad dollars; said regulation should address the entire sector为此我将专注于三个关键原则:
- 首先，ISP不应故意在歧视的基础上减慢或阻止数据I am not necessarily opposed to the concept of “fast lanes”, as I believe that offers significant potential for innovative services, although I recognize the arguments against them; it should be non-negotiable, though, that ISPs cannot purposely disfavor certain types of content.
- 其次，同样，不应允许主导互联网平台阻止其服务中的任何合法内容At the same time, services should have discretion in monetization and algorithms; that anyone should be able to put content on YouTube, for example, does not mean that one has a right to have Google monetize it on their behalf, or surface it to people not looking for it.
- 第三，不应允许互联网服务提供商对自己的内容进行零评价，不应允许平台在其算法中优先考虑自己的内容Granted, this may be a bit extreme; at a minimum there should be strict rules and transparency around transfer pricing and a guarantee that the same rates are allowed to competitive services and content.
正如所指出的那样，互联网的现实聚合理论, is increased centralization; meanwhile, the impact on the Internet on traditional media is an inexorable drive towards consolidation我们目前的法律和反托拉斯法律处理,这一现实,和一个新的法律保证中立是最好的解决方案。
For me the circumstances were a trip to San Francisco; I purposely stayed at a hotel relatively far from where most of my meetings were, giving me no choice but to rely on some combination of scooters, e-bikes, and ride-sharing services滑板车是一个明显的赢家：快速，有趣，方便 - 只要你能找到附近的一个这个城市需要五倍的数量。
所以，很自然地，旧金山禁止他们, at least temporarily: companies will be able to apply for their share of a pool of a mere 1,250 permits; that number may double in six months, but for now the scooter-riding experience will probably be more of a novelty, not something you can rely on事实上，在我旅行结束时，如果我真的匆忙，我知道要使用乘车共享服务。
The result is an urban area stuck on a bizarre local maxima: most households have cars, but rarely use them, particularly in the city, because traffic is bad and parking is — relative to the number of cars — sparse; the alternative is ride-sharing, which incurs the same traffic costs but at least doesn’t require parking然而，现在无论如何，旧金山只允许大约60个停车位 - 街头滑行车。
This is hardly the forum to discuss the oft-head-scratching politics of tech’s de facto capital city, and I can certainly see the downside of scooters, particularly the haphazard way with which they are being deployed; in an environment built for cars scooters get in the way.
What happens, though, if we apply the services business model to hardware? Consider an airplane: I fly thousands of miles a year, but while Stratechery is doing well, I certainly don’t own my own plane! Rather, I fly on an airplane that is owned by an airline that is paid for in part through some percentage of my ticket cost我实际上是“租用”那架飞机上的一个座位，一旦那次飞行消失，除了手机上的新GPS坐标之外，我什么也没有。
现在购买机票的过程，确定我是谁，等等麻烦远比简单地跳跃在我的车,有重大的交易成本,但考虑到我买不起一架飞机值得忍受当我不得不长途跋涉吗What happens, though, when those transaction costs are removed? Well, then you get Uber or its competitors: simply touch a button and a car that would have otherwise been unused will pick you up and take you where you want to go, for a price that is a tiny fraction of what the car cost to buy in the first place同样的模式适用于酒店 - 而不是在您访问的每个城市购买房屋，只需租用房间 - 而Airbnb通过利用未使用的空间将概念提升到一个新的水平。
The enabling factor for both Uber and Airbnb applying a services business model to physical goods is your smartphone and the Internet: it enables distribution and transactions costs to be zero, making it infinitely more convenient to simply rent the physical goods you need instead of acquiring them outright.
What is striking about dockless scooters — at least when one is parked outside your door! — is that they make ride-sharing services feel like half-measures: why even wait five minutes, when you can just scan-and-go? Steve Jobs described computers as心灵的自行车; now that computers are smartphones and connected to the Internet they can conjure up the physical equivalent as well!
事实上，唯一可以让体验更好的东西 - 骑手和其他人 - 将是专用车道，例如，旧金山900英里的停车位To be sure, the city isn’t going to make the conversion overnight, or, given the degree to which San Francisco is in thrall to homeowners, probably ever, but that is particularly a shame in 2018: venture capitalists are willing to fund the entire thing, and I’m not entirely sure why.
Late last month came word that Sequoia Capital was leading a $150 million funding round for Bird, one of the electric scooter companies, valuing the company at $1 billion; a week later came reports that GV was leading a $250 million investment in rival Lime.
The key word in that sentence, though, is “both”: what, precisely, might make Bird and Lime, or any of their competitors, unique? Or, to put it in business parlance, where is the moat? This is where the comparison to ride-sharing services is particularly instructive; I explained早在2014年为什么有更多的护城河的比大多数人认为的拥有权:
This leads to winner-take-all dynamics in a particular geographic area; then, when it comes times to launch in new areas, travelers and brand will give the larger service a head start.
To be sure, these interactions are complicated, and not everything is equal (see, for example, the huge amounts of share Lyft took last year thanks to Uber’s self-inflicted crises)It is that complication, though, and the fact it is exponentially more difficult to build a two-sided network (instead of, say, plopping a bunch of scooters on the street), that creates the conditions for a moat: the entire point of a moat is that it is hard to build.
- Second, bringing self-driving cars to market would entail huge amounts of capital investmentFor one, this means it would be unlikely that Google, a company that rushes to reassure investors when it loses tens of basis points in margin, would do so by itself, and for another, whatever companies did make such an investment would be highly incentivized to maximize utilization of said investment as soon as possible这意味着插入占主导地位的运输即服务网络，这意味着与优步合作。
My contention is that Uber would have been best-served concentrating all of its resources on its driver-centric model, even as it built relationships with everyone in the self-driving space, positioning itself to be the best route to customers for whoever wins the self-driving technology battle.
仍然不被重视的是习惯：您的典型技术第一采用者可能没有问题检查多个应用程序以赶上快速骑行，但我怀疑大多数骑手更喜欢使用他们已经拥有的相同的应用程序To that end, there is certainly a strong impetus for Bird and Lime to spread to new cities, simply to get that first-app-installed advantage, but this is where Uber has the biggest advantage of all: the millions of people who already have the Uber app.
为此，我想优步收购Jump Bikeswas a good idea, and scooters should be next (an acquisition of Bird or Lime may already be too pricey, but Jump has a strong technical team that should be able to get an Uber-equivalent out the door soon)The Uber app already handles multiple kinds of rides; it is a small step to handling multiple kinds of transportation — a smaller step than installing yet another app.
更一般地说，在一切都是服务的世界里，公司可能不得不适应比他们想要的更浅的护城河如果你眯着眼睛，我推荐的优步看起来有点像传统的消费性包装商品（CPG）战略：控制分配（货架空间|屏幕空间）与一些主导产品（例如TIDE | UberX) that provide leverage for new offerings (e.gSwiffer | Jump Bikes)模型不是那么强,但可能会有其他潜在投资锁定期,尤其是独家合同与城市和大学。
Still, that is hardly the sort of dominance that accrues to digital-only aggregators like Facebook or Google, or even Netflix; the physical world is much harder to monopolize一切都将作为服务提供，意味着广泛地提高社会效率 - 更多人可以获得更多产品以降低总体成本 - 即使挖掘护城河的难度意味着大部分效率变为消费者剩余而且，只要风险资本家愿意买单，旧金山这样的城市就应该占据优势。
- That article is perhaps more revealing than the author appreciated [↩︎]
- Note: this article is going to focus on San Francisco for simplicity’s sake, although the broader points have nothing to do with San Francisco specifically; I am aware that the transportation situation is different in different cities — I do live in a different country, after all, in a city with fantastic public transportation and a plethora of personal transportation options[↩︎]
- 第一个不是购买Lyft [↩︎]
- iOS App Store将于下个月满10岁，每周为5亿访客提供服务，截至本周晚些时候，开发商将获得超过1000亿美元的收入。
平台 - 开发者共生
过去几周，特别是在比尔盖茨线, I have been exploring the differences between aggregators and platforms; while aggregators generally harvest already produced content or goods, developers leverage the platform to create something entirely new.
The degree to which applications drive adoption of the underlying platform can, of course, vary; unsurprisingly the monetization potential of the platform relative to developers varies in a correlated wayTraditional Windows, for example, provided very little end user functionality; what made it so valuable were all of the applications built on top of its open platform.
What Valve realized is that playing a game is only one part of the overall customer experience; the experience of discovering and buying the game matters as well, as does the installation and upgrade processMoreover, these customer pain points were developer pain points as well; the original impetus to develop Steam, for example, was the difficulty in getting players to upgrade en masse, something that was essential for games in which players competed online而且，尽管Valve是一家私营公司，并且从未公布过Steam的收入数据，但报告显示该平台产生了每年数十亿美元。
第三 - 这也适用于Steam - App Store大大降低了开发人员的准入门槛; this led to more apps, which attracted more users, which led to more apps, both locking in apps as a competitive advantage and also ensuring that no one app had outsized power (leaving Apple free to通过命令限制类似蒸汽的竞争对手）。
此外，Apple的绝大多数公告都是与这些开发者竞争的：第一个新的应用宣布，测量, should immediately wipe out the only obviously useful Augmented Reality apps in the storeApple also announced a new Podcasts app for Watch, update News, Stocks, and Voice Memo apps, and the only third party demos were about how one of the largest software companies there is — Adobe — would be supporting Apple’s preferred 3D-image formatAnd why not! The implication of owning all of those high-value users is that, on iOS anyways, developers are cheap.
The Mac, though, is a different story: the platform is far smaller than the iPhone; that there remain a number of high quality independent software vendors supporting the Mac is a testament to how valuable it is for developers to be able to build direct relationships with customers that can span years and multiple transactionsStill, there seems little question that the number of Mac apps is, if not trending in the wrong direction, certainly not growing in any meaningful way; there simply aren’t enough users to entice developers.
这意味着苹果的方法必须非常不同于iOS:开发人员而不是颐指气使,苹果宣布将在多年的项目更容易iOS应用程序移植到MacThis is, in a fashion, Apple paying for Mac apps; no, the money isn’t going to developers, but Apple is voluntarily taking on a much greater portion of the porting workload当您没有几乎同样多的用户时，开发人员会更加昂贵。
Go back to Windows: Microsoft had to do very little to convince developers to build on the platform事实上，即使在微软反托拉斯问题的高峰时期，开发人员仍然以压倒性优势继续支持该平台，原因很明显：所有用户都是换句话说，对于Windows，开发人员很便宜。
That is no longer the case today: Windows remains an important platform in the enterprise and for gaming (although Steam, much to Microsoft’s chagrin, takes a good amount of the platform profit there), but the company has no platform presence in mobile, and is in second place in the cloudMoreover, that second place is largely predicated on shepherding existing corporate customers to cloud computing; it is not clear why any new company — or developer — would choose Microsoft.
这是上下文考虑收购GitHub:缺乏吸引开发者的平台有足够的用户,微软“收购”开发者直接通过优越的工具,现在,GitHub,优越的云提供一个有意义的网络效应The problem is that acquiring developers in this way, without the leverage of users, is extraordinarily expensive; it is very hard to imagine GitHub ever generating the sort of revenue that justifies this purchase price.
Again, though, GitHub revenue is not the point; Microsoft has plenty of revenue它还有一个潜在的致命弱点：没有基于用户杠杆的平台Instead Microsoft is betting that a future of open-source, cloud-based applications that exist independent of platforms will be a large-and-increasing share of the future, and that there is room in that future for a company to win by offering a superior user experience for developers directly, not simply exerting leverage on them.
顺便说一句，这正是微软成为GitHub最佳收购者的原因，GitHub已经筹集了3.5亿美元的风险资本，可能不会将其作为一个独立的实体Any company with a platform with a meaningful amount of users would find it very hard to resist the temptation to use GitHub as leverage; on the other side of the spectrum, purely enterprise-focused companies like IBM or Oracle would be tempted to wring every possible bit of profit out of the company.
That, though, is exactly why Microsoft had to pay so much: buying in directly is a whole lot more expensive than using leverage, which can produce equivalent — or better! — returns for much less investment.
The 60 Minutes report was not exactly fair-and-balanced; it featured an anti-tech-monopoly crusader1，一个反技术垄断活动家，一个反技术垄断监管机构和Yelp首席执行官Jeremy Stoppelman而且，似乎不太可能是巧合，Yelp本周在欧盟提出了新的反托拉斯投诉针对谷歌To be sure, just because a report was biased does not mean it was wrong; while我对欧盟针对谷歌购物的反托拉斯案持怀疑态度，开放的情况下对安卓很明确的但是，Yelp并不是直接关注的问题。
Yelp’s position, at least in this video, appears to be that Google’s answer box is anticompetitive because it only includes reviews and ratings from Google; presumably the situation could be resolved were Google to use sources like Yelp但是，这个论点存在三个问题：
- First, the answer box originally included content scraped from sources like Yelp and other vertical search sites; under来自FTC的压力由于Yelp和其他垂直搜索引擎的投诉，谷歌同意在2013年停止这样做。2
- Second, in a telling testament to the power of being on top of search results, Google’s ratings and reviews have improved considerably in the two years since that video was posted; this isn’t a static market (to be sure, this is an argument that could be used on both sides).
- 第三 - 这就是本文的重点--Yelp似乎想要的仅仅是为了让Google更强大。
Over the last few weeks I have been exploring what differences there are between platforms and aggregators, and was reminded of this anecdote from Chamath Palihapitiya in采访塞米尔沙阿：
Chamath：它们都不是平台它们有点像这些滑稽的努力，将你作为第N个优先事项我负责Facebook平台我们大肆吹嘘它就像是一些热门的大事And I remember when we raised money from Bill Gates, 3 or 4 months after — like our funding history was $5M, $83 M, $500M, and then $15B当Facebook平台和盖茨说出一些事情之后几个月就发生了这个15B，“那是一堆屎这不是一个平台平台是指使用它的每个人的经济价值超过创造它的公司的价值然后是一个平台。“
By this measure Windows was indeed the ultimate platform — the company used to brag about only capturing a minority of the total value of the Windows ecosystem — and the operating system’s clear successors are Amazon Web Services and Microsoft’s own Azure Cloud Services在所有这三种情况下，都有强大而持久的业务。
然而，一旦平台在比尔盖茨线下萎缩，建立在“平台”上的企业的长期潜力开始下降例如，Apple的App Store具有平台的所有特征，但Apple非常清楚地捕获了整个生态系统的绝大部分，这既是因为iPhone的盈利能力，也是因为它对App Store经济的控制; the paucity of strong and durable businesses on the App Store is a natural outgrowth of that.
互联网的根本性破坏是将这种动态变为现实First, the Internet has made distribution (of digital goods) free, neutralizing the advantage that pre-Internet distributors leveraged to integrate with suppliers其次，互联网使交易成本为零，使得分销商可以大规模地向最终用户/消费者推进。
This has fundamentally changed the plane of competition: no longer do distributors compete based upon exclusive supplier relationships, with consumers/users an afterthought相反，供应商可以按比例汇总，将消费者/用户作为第一优先顺序By extension, this means that the most important factor determining success is the user experience: the best distributors/aggregators/market-makers win by providing the best experience, which earns them the most consumers/users, which attracts the most suppliers, which enhances the user experience in a virtuous cycle.
结果预测价值的转变保护有吸引力的利润Previous incumbents, such as newspapers, book publishers, networks, taxi companies, and hoteliers, all of whom integrated backwards, lose value in favor of aggregators who aggregate modularized suppliers — which they often don’t pay for — to consumers/users with whom they have an exclusive relationship at scale.
这最终是平台和聚合器之间最重要的区别：平台是强大的，因为它们促进a relationship between 3rd-party suppliers and end users; aggregators, on the other hand, intermediate and control it.
- 谷歌拥有在环境中运营的奢侈品 - 万维网 - 默认情况下完全开放That let the best technology win, and that win was augmented by the data that comes from serving an ever-increasing portion of the market最终结果是最终用户的整合和数据反馈周期使Google搜索越多越好。
- Facebook’s differentiator, meanwhile, is the relationships between friends and family; the company has subsequently integrated that network effect with consumer attention, forcing all of the content providers to jostle for space in the Newsfeed as pure commodities.
It’s worth noting, by the way, why it was that Facebook could come to be a rival to Google in the first place; specifically, Facebook拥有独家数据- 这些关系以及Facebook网站上的所有行为 - 谷歌无法实现换句话说，Facebook不是成为谷歌的一部分，而是完全分开。
Of course that is the bigger problem: I noted above that Google’s library of ratings and reviews has grown substantially over the past few years; users generating content are the ultimate low-cost supplier, and losing that supply to Google is arguably a bigger problem for Yelp than whatever advertising revenue it can wring out from people that would click through on a hypothetical Google Answer Box that used 3rd-party sourcesAnd, it should be noted, that Yelp’s entire business is user-generated reviews: they and similar vertical sites are likely to do a far better job of generating, organizing, and curating such data.
Still, I can’t help but wonder whether or not Yelp’s problem is not that Google is using its own content in the Answer Box, but rather the Answer Box itself; which of these set of results would be better for Yelp’s business, even in a hypothetical world where Answer Box content comes from Yelp?
Presuming that the answer is the image on the right — driving users to Yelp is both better for the bottom line and better for content generation, which mostly happens on the desktop — and it becomes clear that Yelp’s biggest problem is that the more useful Google is — even if it only ever uses Yelp’s data! — the less viable Yelp’s business becomes这正是您在聚合器主导的价值链中所期望的：聚合器完全中断供应商并将其减少为商品。
Still, I have sympathy for Yelp’s position; Stoppelman told 60 Minutes:
Stoppelman is right, but the reason is perhaps less nefarious than it seems; the 60 Minutes report explained why in the voiceover:
Yelp和无数其他网站依靠谷歌为他们带来网络流量 - 为他们的广告商提供眼球。
That, though, isn’t great for Google! It seems a bit rich that Yelp should be free to leverage its app to avoid Google completely, and yet demand that Google continue to feature Yelp prominently in its search results, particularly on mobile, where the Answer Box has particular utility我知道Yelp感觉谷歌已经改变了Yelp在2004年成立时的交易条款，但现实是真正重要的变化是移动。
我觉得引人注目的是一个新的视频that Yelp put out yesterday; while it makes many of the same points as the one above, instead of being focused on regulators it is targeting Google itself, arguing that Google isn’t living up to its own standards by not featuring the best results, and not driving traffic back to sites that make the content Google needs (by, for example, not including prominent links to the content filling its answer boxes; Yelp isn’t asking that they go away, just that they drive traffic to 3rd parties)谷歌可能是一个聚合器，但它仍然需要供应，这意味着它需要一个可持续的开放网络公司应该倾听。
Facebook,不幸的是,供应商面临着没有这样的限制:确实是有区别的内容是由Facebook的用户,并全资拥有的FacebookFacebook is even further from the Bill Gates Line than Google is: the latter at least needs commoditized suppliers; the former can take or leave them on a whim, and does.
这就是为什么我已经意识到一个受欢迎的处方Facebook的主导地位,本周数据便携性,提出一个进步联盟组织在伞下免于Facebook,错了。3The problem with data portability is that it goes both ways: if you can take your data out of Facebook to other applications, you can do the same thing in the other direction那么，问题是哪个实体可能在数据方面具有更大的重心：Facebook，其社交网络，或几乎其他任何东西？
The broader takeaway is that distinguishing between platforms and aggregators isn’t simply an academic exercise: it should affect how companies think about their competitive environment vis-à-vis the biggest companies in tech, and, just as importantly, it should weigh heavily on regulatorsThe Microsoft antitrust battles of the 2000s were in many respects about enforcing interoperability as a way of breaking into the Microsoft platform; today antitrust should be far more concerned about aggregators capturing everything they touch by virtue of their control of end users.
That’s the thing about the “Generals fight the last war” saying; it’s usually applied to the losing side that made mistake after mistake while the victors leveraged the new world order.
- 我已经讨论过为什么我不同意Gary Reback关于垄断和创新的看法这个每日更新[↩︎]
- 关于FTC的决定，是的，正如华尔街日报报道的那样, some FTC staff members recommended suing Google; what is not true is that the recommendation was unanimous, or that FTC commissioners ultimately deciding to go in another direction was unusual事实上，其他团体的其他工作人员团队建议反对该诉讼，而FTC委员的决定是一致的同样，这并不是说这是正确的决定，而是流行的概念 - 包括60分钟片段中报道的内容 - 有点偏离[↩︎]