每日免费更新:采访Patreon首席执行官Jack Conte和会员首席执行官Drew Strojny

战略偶尔进行采访; these are always in the subscriber-only Daily Update, in part as a benefit for subscribers, but also because Weekly Articles are more representative of what potential subscribers should expect if they choose to receive每日更新

我在这种情况下做了一个例外:Patreon刚宣布他们正在收购会员,我在Stratechery上使用的会员软件这是一个收购和空间,不仅与Stratechery的业务有关,而且也是我谈到的一些主要概念特别是媒体的演变为此,并且考虑到及时性,每日更新可供任何人阅读这里

Facebook镜头

虽然上周我在假期主要是不插电,与Facebook的消息令人失望的财报和随后的股票——下降任何公司在美国最大的单日跌幅股市历史- 我无法抗拒188足球比分直播网:

我对这条推文感到后悔,不仅仅是因为“在188足球比分直播网上打气”总是冒险回来当Stratechery开始我写第一篇文章that one of the topics I looked forward to exploring was “Why Wall Street is not completely insane”; I was thinking at the time about Apple, a company that, especially at that time, was regularly posting eye-popping revenue and profit numbers that did not necessarily lead to corresponding increases in the stock price, much to the consternation of Apple shareholdersThe underlying point should be an obvious one: a stock price is about future earnings, not already realized ones; that the iPhone maker had just had a great quarter was an important signal about the future, but not a determinant factor, and that those pointing to the past to complain about a price predicated on the future were missing the point.

当然,这正是我在推文中所做的。

不过,值得注意的是,虽然这些苹果股东的显式的推理可能是嫌疑人,他们的观点被证明是正确的:2013年4月Apple报道quarterly revenue of $43.6 billion and profit of $9.5 billion, and the day I started Stratechery the stock price was $63.25; five years laterApple报道季度收入为611亿美元,利润为138亿美元,周五股价为190.98美元。

要明确的是,我一直同意苹果投资者的观点:我早期的几篇文章 -苹果黑天鹅两只熊,尤其是Clayton Christensen错了什么- 关于说明苹果公司的业务比大多数人意识到的更加可持续发展,并且可持续性和防御性比任何一个季度的结果更重要。

The question is if a similar case can be made for Facebook: certainly my tweet taken literally was naive for the exact reasons those Apple investor complaints missed the point five years ago; what about the sentiment, though? Just how good of a business is Facebook?

与许多这样的事情一样,这一切都取决于你用什么镜头来检查这个问题。

镜头1:Facebook的财务状况

正如盈利的情况一样,Facebook股票的走势只是关于结果以及未来预期的全部结果On Wednesday, Facebook’s stock closed at $217, but then its earnings showed revenue of $13.2 billion, slightly below Wall Street’s expectations; unsurprisingly, the stock slid about 8% in after-hours trading to around $200两条评论激发了真正的下跌在收益电话会议上来自Facebook首席财务官Dave Wehner关于Facebook未来的期望。

首先,关于收入:

Turning now to the revenue outlook; our total revenue growth rate decelerated approximately 7 percentage points in Q2 compared to Q1我们的总收入增长率将在2018年下半年继续减速,我们预计第三季度和第四季度的收入增长率将比前几个季度的高个位数下降。

第二,关于营业利润率:

Turning now to expenses; we continue to expect that full-year 2018 total expenses will grow in the range of 50% to 60% compared to last year…Looking beyond 2018, we anticipate that total expense growth will exceed revenue growth in 2019在接下来的几年中,我们预计我们的营业利润率将以百分比的形式趋向30年代中期。

从纯粹的财务角度来看,这两条新闻都不太理想,但至少可以理解In terms of revenue, Facebook’s growth is from a very large base, which means that this quarter’s 42% year-over-year revenue growth to $13.2 billion from $9.3 billion is, in absolute terms, 36% greater than the year ago’s 45% revenue growth (from $6.4 billion)To put it in simpler terms, massive growth rates inevitably decline even as massive absolute growth remains; as a point of comparison, Google in the same relative timeframe (14 years after incorporation) grew 35 percent to $12.21 billion (i.eFacebook在两个指标上都更好)。

至于经营利润率的下降,在一个正常的公司 - 即一个边际成本 - 收入减少不一定会导致保证金有意义的下降,因为减少产品销售意味着降低销售成本当然,Facebook不是一个普通的公司:他们销售的广告的唯一边际成本是信用卡费用;像大多数科技公司一样the vast majority of costs are “below the line” (mostly in Research & Development, but also Sales & Marketing and General & Administrative); it follows, then, that a decrease in revenue growth would, absent an explicit effort to decrease unrelated (to revenue) expense growth, lead to lower operating margins.

In fact, Facebook is not only not decreasing expenses, they are going in the opposite direction; expenses are growing faster than ever, even as revenue growth clearly fell off:

即使费用增长增加,Facebook的收入增长也在减少

I suspect it is this chart, more than anything else, that explains the drop in Facebook’s stock price: it’s not one thing or the other; it is both revenue growth slowing and expenses accelerating at the same time, with all indications from management are that the trends will continue.

Again, relatively speaking Facebook is in great shape financially — I already noted the company had better revenue and growth numbers than Google at a similar point, and their operating margins are substantially better as well — but there’s no question this is a pretty substantial shift in the company’s longterm outlook金融镜头仍然提供了一个非常积极的观点,但它确实比以前更不积极。

镜头2:Facebook的产品

关于Facebook的写作总是有点混乱,因为Facebook公司和Facebook都是产品,毫无疑问,多年来,最大量的消极性一直围绕着后者。To that end, it is tempting to conflate the two; for example, the New York Times wrote in an article headlinedFacebook开始为丑闻付出代价

近两年,Facebook已经出现防弹尽管一系列丑闻的滥用其庞大的社交网络但硅谷公司的连胜在周三结束时表示,问题的积累已开始损害其数十亿美元的业务 - 并且成本将持续数月持续。

This is true as far as it goes, particular when it comes to expenses: Facebook is on pace to increase its security and content review teams to 20,000 people, a three-fold increase in 18 months; that is why CEO Mark Zuckerberg去年在财报电话会上发出警告

我指示我们的团队在我们正在进行的其他投资之上投入大量资金进行投资,这将极大地影响我们未来的盈利能力,我希望我们的投资者直接从我这里听到我相信这会使我们的社会更加强大,这样做对我们所有人来说都是长期的好事但是我想要清楚我们的首要任务是什么保护我们的社区比最大化利润更重要。

更不清楚的是,Facebook的争议有哪些影响,如果有的话多年来有三个因素使Facebook在收入增长方面成为一个怪物:

  • 用户数量在增加
  • 广告加载(News Feed)所示的广告数量增加
  • 每次广告的价格都在上涨

A year ago, though, Facebook stopped increasing ad load; as我有记录,这也导致了更加严重的per-ad增加价格,但这仍是一种阻燃在增长。

然后,在过去一年中,Facebook的用户增长开始放缓,并且在利润最高的北美地区,已经有效稳定That, though, isn’t because of Facebook’s controversies: it is because the app has run out of people! The company has 241 million monthly active users in the US & Canada, 65% of the total population of 372 million (including children who aren’t supposed to have accounts before the age of 13).

考虑到几乎完全渗透的程度,在评估Facebook的健康状况时更重要的是没有迹象表明该公司正在失去用户Sure, the numbers in North America decreased by a million in Q4 2017, but now that million is back; I expect something similar when it comes to the million users the company lost in Europe when it required affirmative consent from users to continue using the app because of GDPR.

The fact of the matter is that nothing has happened to diminish Facebook’s moat when it comes to attracting and retaining users: the number one feature of a social network is how many people are on it, and for all intents and purposes everyone is on Facebook — whether they like it or not.

有趣的是,Facebook正致力于通过关注群体来进一步深化这种护城河扎克伯格在财报电话会议上说:

Facebook上有超过2亿人成为有意义的团体成员,这些社区在加入后会成为您Facebook体验中最重要的部分,也是您现实世界社交基础设施的重要组成部分这些是新父母,稀有疾病患者,志愿者,部署到新基地的军人家庭等等的团体。

我们相信Facebook上的每个人都有一个社区这些有意义的社区经常在线和离线消费,并将人们聚集在一起我们发现每个伟大的社区都有一位敬业的领导者但是经营一个团队可能会花费很多时间我们有一个路线图,让这变的很容易这将使更有意义的团体形成,这将有助于我们找到相关的建议,并最终实现我们的五年目标,帮助10亿人成为有意义的社区的一部分。

扎克伯格指的是他的2017年宣言建立全球社区; it is a particularly attractive goal from Facebook’s perspective because it makes the product stickier than ever.

所有这一切,通过该公司产品的镜头观看Facebook的最重要原因是Facebook的应用程序的庞大规模使得很容易失去其他产品的仍然可观的增长潜力的网站特别是Instagramrecently passed 1 billion users, which is an incredible number that is still less than half of Facebook the app’s total users; by definition Instagram has reached less than half of its addressable market.

此外,Instagram不仅一直没有被Facebook的争议,它是这样一个令人信服的产品,据坊间传言说,大多数“Facebook-nevers”或“Facebook-quitters”欣然承认每天使用这项服务该应用程序还没有接近实现其货币化潜力:虽然Feed具有与Facebook相同的广告负载,但是SnapChat灵感的故事格式that has exploded in usage has barely been monetized; in fact, Facebook’s executives attributed some of the company’s slowing revenue growth to increased Stories usage (instead of the feed)从纯粹的财务角度来看,这无疑是令人担忧的问题,但从战略角度来看,这意味着Instagram处于一个更加强大的地位请记住,收入和利润都是落后的指标,Instagram故事的爆炸式增长是一个极端的例子,说明为什么要记住这一重要事实。

WhatsApp也越来越引人注目:不仅应用程序仍然是世界上大部分地区的主要通信媒介,而且添加WhatsApp状态更新和故事大大提高了服务的货币化潜力 - 这是Facebook甚至没有开始意识到的潜力。1

在产品方面存在一定程度的长期风险:Facebook同时收购了Instagram和WhatsApp,但该公司不应该被允许获得另一个与这两个相似的规模和速度的社交网络,我怀疑它们会是什么这一担忧,非常遥远未来的:目前产品镜头显示,Facebook仍像以前一样强大。

镜头3:Facebook的广告基础设施

This lens takes the exact opposite perspective of Lens 2; looking at the company from a product perspective shows four different apps, but looking at the company from an advertising perspective shows a single integrated machine.

这是Facebook高管在上周的财报电话会议上反复提到的一点这是Wehner(强调我的):

就Facebook和Instagram而言,它们显然都有助于收入增长Instagram正在快速增长,并为增长做出越来越大的贡献我们对Instagram的发展方式感到满意。Facebook和Instagram实际上是一个广告生态系统。

扎克伯格:

我们也正在将故事发展成一种优秀的广告形式我们在Instagram上取得了最大的进步,但本季度,我们开始在Facebook上测试Stories广告......

首席运营官Sheryl Sandberg补充道:

由于我们有很多不同的地方,你在Instagram和WhatsApp和Facebook都有Stories格式,随着机会量的增加,广告商会对此感兴趣。

Zuckerberg and Sandberg were obviously talking about the potential for advertising in Stories, but that potential is simply a repeat of what has already happened with Feed ads: Facebook spent years building out News Feed advertising — not simply the display and targeting technology but also the entire back-end apparatus for advertisers, connections with non-Facebook data sources and points-of-sale, relationships with ad buyers, etc- 然后简单地将Instagram插入该基础设施。

这种综合方法的回报不容小觑尽管最初的产品团队可以自由地专注于用户体验,但Instagram在货币化方面的规模要比他们自己更快。Facebook的应用程序也受益,因为Instagram增加了Facebook广告活动的表面积,即使它增加了Facebook的定位能力。

但最大的影响是潜在的竞争很有可能专注于“投资回报率”中的“R” - 投资回报 - 正如我刚才注意到的Instagram + Facebook使其更具吸引力Just as important, though, is the “I”; there is tremendous benefit to being a one-stop shop for advertisers, who can save time and money by focusing their spend on FacebookThe tools are familiar, the buys are made across platforms, and as Zuckerberg and Sandberg alluded to with regard to Stories, the ads themselves only need to be made once to be used across multiple platforms为什么甚至在其他地方做广告呢?

这就是为什么广告镜头可能是最有用的,因为它要了解Facebook的业务有多强大,以及为什么Instagram的收购特别是如此重要对于Facebook应用程序锁定的所有讨论,有理由怀疑参与度是否会随着时间的推移而减少,特别是在年轻人中,或者如果争议可能会降低使用率 -或者更糟Instagram是一个独立的公司,广告商可能会发现自己别无选择,只能分散他们的广告到多个公司,一旦他们的广告是多样化的,这将是一个规模小得多的一步目标用户在其他网站SnapChat或188足球比分直播网吗无论Facebook的应用程序发生什么,现在都没有理由让Facebook成为广告平台。

镜头4:Facebook的倍增护城河

Facebook的广告护城河可能是最重要的,和其网络护城河最强,但该公司已经增加了护城河,特别是在去年。

The first is GDPR; this may seem counter-intuitive, given that Facebook said last week the regulation cost them a million users, and that one of the factors that would hurt revenue growth was the increased controls the company was giving users when it comes to controlling their personal information但是记住,GDPR适用于每个人,不仅仅是Facebook,桑德伯格指出在调用(强调我的):

广告商仍在适应变化,因此现在知道长期影响还为时过早而GDPR和其他可能发生在我们身上或可能在监管下发生的隐私变化等事情可能会使广告更具相关性我们知道不会改变的一件事是,广告商总是在寻找最高的投资回报率机会和赢得预算最重要的是我们在行业中的相对表现,我们相信我们会继续做得很好。

我做了这个确切点以前

While GDPR advocates have pointed to the lobbying Google and Facebook have done against the law as evidence that it will be effective, that is to completely miss the point: of course neither company wants to incur the costs entailed in such significant regulation, which will absolutely restrict the amount of information they can collect遗漏的是,数字广告的增长是一个长期趋势,首先是眼球:在手机上花费的时间越来越多,广告收入将不可避免地随之而来The calculation that matters, then, is not how much Google or Facebook are hurt in isolation, but how much they are hurt relatively to their competitors, and the obvious answer is “a lot less”, which, in the context of that secular increase, means growth.

Secondly, all of those costs that Facebook are incurring for security and content review that are reducing operating margin? Perhaps the stock market would feel better if they were characterized as moat expansion, because that’s exactly what they are: any would-be Facebook competitor is going to have to make a similar investment, and do it from a dramatically lower revenue base.

此外,正如Facebook通过将其广告基础架构扩展到其所有产品而受益,它也可以通过其安全措施来做同样的事情扎克伯格说:

More broadly, our strategy is to use Facebook’s computing infrastructure, business platforms and security systems to serve people across all of our apps…We’re using AI systems in our global community operations team to fight spam, harassment, hate speech, and terrorism across all of our apps to keep people safe这对于像WhatsApp和Instagram这样的应用来说非常有用,因为它可以帮助我们更有效地应对超高速增长的挑战。

This is why the lens with which you view Facebook matters so much: the exact same set of facts viewed from a financial perspective are a clear negative; from a moat perspective they are a clear positive.

镜头5:Facebook的Raison D'être

毋庸置疑,一旦你通过财务视角看待Facebook,企业的健康状况就难以与之争辩(坦率地说,财务从现象到梦幻,但它都是相对的)这就是为什么我不禁想知道Facebook股票的崩溃和随后的一般庆祝活动是否存在更为根本的东西。

To return to the early years of Stratechery, it was striking how widespread Facebook skepticism was; I first tried to argue otherwise五年前的今天,并在2015年感到被迫写Facebook大纪元这样开始:

我很喜欢说很少有公司像Facebook一样被低估,特别是在硅谷Admittedly, it seems strange to say such a thing about a $245 billion company with a trailing 12-month P/E ratio of 88, but that is Wall Street sentiment; in the tech bubble many seem to simply assume the company is ever on the brink of teetering “just like MySpace”, never mind the fact that the social network pioneer barely broke 100 million registered users, less than 10% of the number of active users Facebook attracted in a single day late last month或者,正如更清醒的头脑可能会争辩的那样,Facebook今天看起来势不可挡,但十年前谷歌看起来势不可挡,当时社交似乎无处不在:肯定Facebook杀手迫在眉睫!

这种情绪肯定会恢复正常!

有可能转向基于广泛的精神分析,我认为很多Facebook的怀疑主义是因为很多内容看起来如此浅薄,或者在过去几年的情况下,主动恶意这样的产品如何生存?

事实上,它存在的原因在于它存在的原因:Facebook开始在扎克伯格的哈佛宿舍里通过完全数字化已经存在的离线关系,无论是在现实生活中还是在实际的物理“脸书”中Facebook是如此强大,因为它与现实世界的直接联系:它是浅薄的,有点恶意,有时是恶意的 - 是的,往往是好的 - 因为我们人类是浅薄的,有点恶意,有时是恶意的 - 是的,往往是好的。

By extension, to insist that Facebook will die any day now is in some respects to suggest that humanity will cease to exist any day now; granted, it is a company and companies fail, but even if Facebook failed it would only be a matter of time before another Facebook rose to replace it.

That seems unlikely: for all of the company’s travails and controversies over the past few years, its moats are deeper than ever, its money-making potential not only huge but growing both internally and secularly; to that end, what is perhaps most distressing of all to would-be competitors is in fact this quarter’s results: at the end of the day Facebook took a massive hit通过选择; the company is not maximizing the short-term, it is spending the money and suppressing its revenue potential in favor of becoming more impenetrable than ever.

确实是“彻底的灾难”。

  1. There is Messenger as well; I am更加怀疑其长期货币化潜力因为其自然广告空间-状态更新和故事基本上是Facebook是什么(↩︎]

欧盟委员会(European Commission)和Android

要了解谷歌如何以43亿欧元的罚款和90天的最后期限来改变其围绕Android的业务实践,关键是要记住一个日期:2005年7月。1那时谷歌收购了一款名为Android的仍处于开发阶段的移动操作系统,并将收购置于背景中,史蒂夫·乔布斯是,至少在公开场合,“不相信人们想在一个小小的屏幕上看电影”He was, of course, referring to the iPod; Apple would go on to release an iPod with video playback a few months later, but the iPhone was still a year-and-a-half away from being revealed.

换句话说,Android,至少在开始时,并不是对Apple的回应;2真正的目标是微软(以及较小程度上的黑莓手机),它似乎有望像智能手机一样掌控智能手机That was an untenable situation for Google; then Vice-President of Product Management Sundar Pichai wrote在Google Public Policy博客上关于公司在PC上面临的挑战:

谷歌认为,浏览器市场仍然在很大程度上没有竞争力,这阻碍了用户的创新This is because Internet Explorer is tied to Microsoft’s dominant computer operating system, giving it an unfair advantage over other browsersCompare this to the mobile market, where Microsoft cannot tie Internet Explorer to a dominant operating system, and its browser therefore has a much lower usage.

对谷歌来说最重要的是对最终用户的访问:这才是最终用户的利益聚合飞轮转在个人电脑上,公司通过更好的结合使用成功,访问新网址(并将其设为主页)非常简单,并与OEM合作,从一开始就将Google设置为主页All would be more difficult to achieve on mobile, at least mobile as it was understood in 2005: applications were notoriously difficult to find and install, and Microsoft and Blackberry had locked down their operating systems to a much greater extent than Microsoft had on the PC.

因此Android开局:谷歌决定直接在移动操作系统上采用微软,其最强大的工具不会是操作系统的质量,而是商业模式为此,Google自然而然地做到了重新安装Android的用户界面once the iPhone was announced, the business model remained Microsoft kryptonite: whereas Microsoft charged a per-device licensing fee, just as it had with Windows, Android would not only be free and open-source, Google would actually share search revenue derived from Android with OEMs that installed the operating system.

Of course Android also ended up being a much better experience than Windows Mobile in the post-iPhone world, and the deal was irresistible to OEMs flailing for a response to the iPhone: get a (somewhat) comparable (sort-of) touch-based operating system for free, and even make money after the initial sale! Indeed, not only did Android effectively kill Microsoft’s mobile efforts, it went on to take over the world via a massive ecosystem of device makers and mobile carriers that competed to drive down costs and increase distribution.

Android的成功

Android增加竞争是Pichai的焦点 - 现在是Google的首席执行官 -最新博文作出回应:

今天,欧盟委员会发布了针对Android及其商业模式的竞争决定该决定忽略了Android手机与iOS手机竞争的事实,89%的受访者对委员会自己的市场调查证实了这一点It also misses just how much choice Android provides to thousands of phone makers and mobile network operators who build and sell Android devices; to millions of app developers around the world who have built their businesses with Android; and billions of consumers who can now afford and use cutting-edge Android smartphones今天,由于Android,有超过24,000台设备,每个价位,来自1,300多个不同的品牌......

Pichai没有说的是,这种竞争与其说是一个特性是关键:开源Android智能手机发展意味着任何人都可以进入商品化,尽管很少有人能够随着时间的推移利润这包括谷歌,至少在开始时,这是设计:记住,Android的重点不是像Windows一样赚钱,而是阻止Windows或任何其他操作系统在谷歌和用户之间进行风险投资家比尔·格利在2011年的一篇文章中解释说Android的货运列车

就此而言,Android以及Chrome和Chrome OS并不是典型商业意义上的“产品”他们没有计划成为他们自己的“经济城堡”。相反,他们是非常昂贵和非常具有攻击性的“护城河”,由谷歌城堡的高度和大小[(搜索广告)]资助谷歌的目标是防御而不是冒犯他们并不是想在Android或Chrome上赚钱他们想要在他们自己和消费者之间生活任何一层并使其免费(甚至不到免费)因为这些层基本上是没有可变成本的软件产品,所以这是一种非常可行的防御策略In essence, they are not just building a moat; Google is also scorching the earth for 250 miles around the outside of the castle to ensure no one can approach it最好的我可以说,他们做得很好。

Indeed they were, but the strategy had a built-in problem: Android was, well, open source, and just as that helped Android spread, it could just as easily be forked into an initially compatible operating system that didn’t connect to Google’s services — the castle that Google was trying to protect all along谷歌为护城河需要一堵墙,并在Google Play商店中找到了一面墙。

Google Play商店和Google Play服务

谷歌Play商店与Android的用户界面不同,是对iPhone的回应,特别是2008年App Store的成功推出虽然Play商店在应用商店时往往落后于尖端应用程序,特别是在早期,但它很快就成为Google最有价值的服务之一,无论是在Android上有用还是在赚钱方面。

但请注意,Play商店是Android的一部分:它一直是Google的Android版本的封闭源代码,与Gmail,地图和YouTube等其他Google服务一样然而,谷歌对所有这些应用程序的问题在于,它们是使用操作系统进行更新的,而OEM和运营商 - 在设备最初售出时只赚钱 - 并没有特别鼓励更新操作系统。

Google’s solution was Google Play Services; first released in 2010 as a part of Android 2.2 Froyo, Google Play Services was distributed via the Play Store and provided an easily updatable API layer that would, in the initial version, allow Google to update its own apps independent of operating system updates这是一个优雅的解决方案,解决了Google为Android发布所采用的免费模式所固有的真正问题:广泛的碎片化很快所有谷歌的应用程序是建立在谷歌播放服务,然后,在2012年,谷歌开始开放给开发商。

The initial version was quite modest; here is the在Google+上发布公告

在谷歌I / O我们宣布一个预览的谷歌服务,一个新的发展平台,开发人员想要将谷歌服务整合到他们的应用程序今天,我们开始全面推出Google Play服务v1.0,其中包括Google+ API和新的OAuth 2.0功能该部署将涵盖运行最新版Google Play商店的Android 2.2+设备上的所有用户。

Over the next several years, though, Google devoted more and more of its effort — and its most interesting APIs, like location and maps and gaming services — to Google Play Services; meanwhile, whatever equivalent service was in the open-source version of Android was effectively frozen in timeThe net result is incredibly significant to teasing out this case: Google Play Services silently shifted ever more apps from Android apps to Google Play apps; today, no Google app will function on open-source Android without extensive reworking, and the same applies to ever more 3rd-party apps as well.

注意到,在我的估计中,很难将此视为违反反托拉斯法的行为事实上,谷歌正在解决Android生态系统中的一个合法问题,该公司没有让任何开发人员使用Google Play服务API而不是现在仍然可用的更基本的API。

欧盟委员会案例

欧盟委员会认定谷歌有三种违反欧盟反垄断规则的罪名:

  • Illegally tying Google’s search and browser apps to the Google Play Store; to get the Google Play Store and thus a full complement of apps, OEMs have to pre-install Google search and Chrome and make them available within one screen of the home page.
  • 非法支付OEM以在他们制作的每个Android设备上专门预安装Google搜索。
  • 非法禁止安装谷歌应用程序的OEM销售任何运行Android分支的设备。

孤立地看,这些似乎从最不成问题到最成问题。

  • The Google Play Store has always been an exclusive Google app; it seems that Google ought to be able to distribute it exclusively as part of a bundle if it so chooses.
  • Pinning all revenue from Google Search to exclusivity on all devices quite obviously makes it very difficult for alternative search services to build share (as they lack access to pre-installs, one of the most effective channels for customer acquisition); this seems to be more of a Google Search dominance issue than an Android dominance issue though.
  • 预测OEM上的任何Google应用程序(包括Google Play商店)的可用性利用开放源码特性将不包括谷歌的Android设备上应用似乎更多的问题比谷歌坚称其应用是分布在一个包The latter is Google’s prerogative; the former is dictating OEM actions just because Google can.

This is where the history of Android matters; before Google Play Services, the primary challenge in building a competitive fork of Android would have been convincing developers to upload their apps to a new app store (since Google would obviously not want to put its apps, including the Play Store, on said fork)然而,这个分支从未实现,因为谷歌的合同条款禁止原始设备制造商销售任何基​​于这种分支的设备。

Today the situation is very different: that contractual limitation could go away tomorrow (or, more accurately, in 90 days), and it wouldn’t really matter because, as I explained above, many apps are no longer Android apps but are rather Google Play apps在Android fork上运行绝不是不可能的,但大多数都需要更多的返工而不是简单地上传到新的App Store。

In short, in my estimation the real antitrust issue is Google contractually foreclosing OEMs from selling devices with non-Google versions of Android; the only way to undo that harm in 2018, though, would be to make Google Play Services available to any Android fork.

委员会的补救措施

To be sure, that’s not exactly what the European Commission ordered (in fact, “Google Play Services” does not appear a single time in the press release); the Commission seems to feel that the three issues do stand alone这意味着Google必须单独回复每个人:

  • Google has to untie the Play Store from Search and the Chrome browser
  • 谷歌已经停止向OEM支付全组合搜索专营权
  • 谷歌再也无法阻止原始设备制造商销售带有Android分支的设备

到目前为止最重要的是第一个(尽管事实上它是最弱的指控,据我估计)三星或任何其他OEM可以在90天内销售仅使用Bing搜索的设备和Google Play商店(当然可以下载Google搜索)This will likely accrue to consumers’ benefit: Microsoft, Google, and other providers will soon be bidding to be the default search option, and, given the commoditized nature of Android devices, it is likely that most of what they are willing to pay will go towards lower prices.

Still, it is an unsatisfying remedy: Google built Android for the express purpose of monetizing search, and to be denied that by regulatory edict feels off; Google, though, bears a lot of the blame for going too far with its contracts.

More broadly, the European Commission continues to be a bit too cavalier about denying companies — well, Google, mostly — the right to monetize the products they spend billions of dollars at significant risk to develop; this was我对去年谷歌购物案的主要反对意见In this case I narrowly come down on the Commission’s side almost by accident: I think Google acted illegally by contractually foreclosing Android competitors at a time when it might have made a difference, but I am concerned that the Commission’s publicly released reasoning doesn’t seem to grasp exactly how Android has developed, the choices Google made, and why.

值得注意的是,我高度怀疑谷歌会采取什么不同的方式:当涉及到公司的目标时,Android无法取得更大的成功 - 如果有的话,这一裁决证明了该产品的成功程度。

  1. 收购的确切日期未知[↩︎]
  2. 对于那些想知道的人,谷歌首席执行官埃里克施密特直到2006年8月才加入苹果董事会[↩︎]

英特尔和集成的危险

上个星期Brian Krzanich辞去英特尔首席执行官职务违反公司的非友善政策后然而,克尔扎尼奇离开的细节最终并不重要:他的任期是一个严重的失败,其程度现在才刚刚出现。

英特尔过时的机会

When Krzanich was appointed CEO in 2013 it was already clear that arguably the most important company in Silicon Valley’s history was in trouble: PCs, long Intel’s chief money-maker, were in decline, leaving the company ever more reliant on the sale of high-end chips to data centers; Intel had effectively zero presence in mobile, the industry’s other major growth area.

仍然,我把Krzanich面临的局面视为机遇,画了一个与面临的挑战传奇的安迪格罗夫三十年前:

然而到了20世纪80年代,由IBM PC推动的微处理器业务推动了增长,而DRAM业务完全商品化并由日本制造商主导然而英特尔仍然将自己塑造成一家存储公司这是他们的身份,地狱或高水。

到1986年,高水位迅速威胁要拖累英特尔事实上,1986年仍是唯一在英特尔的历史,他们亏损全球产能过剩导致DRAM价格暴跌,英特尔迅速成为DRAM中最小的参与者之一,感受到了严重的痛苦正是在这种悲惨和悲观的气氛下,格罗夫接任首席执行官并且,在一个高度情绪化但显而易见的明显决定中,他一劳永逸地让英特尔退出了内存制造业务。

英特尔已经是世界上最好的微处理器设计公司他们只需要接受并拥抱自己的命运。

快速面对Krzanich面临的挑战:

Krzanich正在担任首席执行官,这正处于一种厄运和阴郁的气氛中并且,在一个高度情绪化但越来越明显的决定中,他应该将英特尔提交给芯片制造业务,即根据其他公司的设计制造芯片。

英特尔已经是世界上最好的微处理器制造公司他们需要接受并拥抱自己的命运。

这篇文章现在已经过时了:在一系列重大事件中,英特尔已经失去了制造业的领先优势Ben Bajarin上周写道英特尔的真实时刻

这场比赛不仅让英特尔超越了他们台积电目前正在7nm采样,AMD将在英特尔之前的服务器和客户端PC上采用7nm技术对于那些了解其历史的人来说,这是AMD首次将英特尔击败为流程节点不仅如此,AMD还可能至少在英特尔的7纳米领先18个月,我认为这是保守的。

As Bajarin notes, 7nm for TSMC (or Samsung or Global Foundries) isn’t necessarily better than Intel’s 10nm; chip-labeling isn’t what it used to be问题在于,英特尔的10nm工艺并未接近批量发货,竞争对手的7nm工艺也是如此英特尔落后了,它对集成的坚持承担了很大一部分责任。

英特尔的集成模型

Intel, like Microsoft, had its fortunes made by IBM: eager to get the PC an increasingly vocal section of its customer base demanded out the door, the mainframe maker outsourced much of the technology to third party vendors, the most important being an operating system from Microsoft and a processor from IntelThe impact of the former decision was the formation of an entire ecosystem centered around MS-DOS, and eventually Windows, cementing Microsoft’s dominance.

Intel was a slightly different story; while an operating system was simply bits on a disk, and thus easily duplicated for all of the PCs IBM would go on to sell, a processor was a physical device that needed to be manufactured为此,IBM坚持拥有“第二个来源”,即第二个非英特尔制造商用于英特尔芯片Intel chose AMD, and licensed first the 8086 and 8088 designs that were in the original IBM PC, and later, again under pressure from IBM, the 80286 design; the latter was particularly important because it was designed to be upward compatible with everything that followed.

这为英特尔未来35年的战略 - 以及巨大的盈利能力 - 奠定了基础首先,英特尔x86设计的主导地位得益于其与DOS / Windows的集成:特别是,DOS / Windows创建了开发人员和PC用户的双边市场,DOS / Windows运行在x86上。

微软和英特尔在PC集成价值链

However, thanks to its licensing deal with AMD, Intel wasn’t automatically entitled to all of the profits that would result from that integration; thus Intel doubled-down on an integration of its own: the design and manufacture of x86 chips,英特尔将投入巨额资金,创造新的和更快的设计(386年,486年,奔腾,等等),并投入大量的资金投入到更小和更高效的生产过程,将推动的极限摩尔定律尽管获得了AMD的许可,但这一两次打击将确保英特尔的芯片成为PC制造商唯一的现实选择,使该公司能够获得x86与DOS / Windows集成所产生的绝大部分利润。

英特尔在很大程AMD did take the performance crown around the turn of the century with the Athlon 64, but the company was unable to keep up with Intel financially when it came to fabs, and Intel illegally leveraged its dominant position with OEMs to keep them buying mostly Intel parts; then, a few years later, Intel not only took back the performance lead with its Core architecture, but settled into the “tick-tock” strategy where it alternated new designs and new manufacturing processes on a regular schedule整合优势是真实的。

台积电的模块化方法

与此同时,台湾正在酝酿一场革命1987年,Morris Chang创立台湾半导体制造公司(TSMC),承诺“诚信,承诺,创新,客户信赖”诚信和客户信任提到了Chang的承诺,即台积电绝不会与自己的设计竞争客户:公司只关注制造业。

This was a completely novel idea: at that time all chip manufacturing was integrated a la Intel; the few firms that were only focused on chip design had to scrap for excess capacity at Integrated Device Manufacturers (IDMs) who were liable to steal designs and cut off production in favor of their own chips if demand rose现在台积电提供了一个更有吸引力的替代品,即使他们的制造能力落后。

然而,随着时间的推移,台积电变得更好,很大程度上是因为它没有选择:很快它的制造能力只落后于行业标准一步,并在十年之内赶上了(尽管英特尔仍然领先于所有人)Meanwhile, the fact that TSMC existed created the conditions for an explosion in “fabless” chip companies that focused on nothing but design例如,在20世纪90年代末期,专注于专用图形芯片的公司出现了爆炸性增长:几乎所有公司都是由台积电制造的而且,一直以来,增加的业务让台积电在制造能力上投入更多。

集成的英特尔与竞争激烈的模块化生态系统竞争

这代表了对英特尔主导地位的三管齐下攻击:

  • 许多新的无晶圆厂设计公司正在开发可直接替代英特尔芯片用于通用计算的产品其中绝大多数基于ARM架构,但AMD在2008年剥离了其晶圆厂业务(命名为GlobalFoundries),并成为x86芯片的无晶圆设计师。
  • 由无晶圆厂设计公司设计的专用芯片越来越多地用于以前属于通用处理器领域的业务特别是图形芯片were well-suited to machine learning, cryptocurrency mining, and other highly “embarrassingly parallel” operations; many of those applications have spawned specialized chips of their own例如,有专门的比特币芯片,或谷歌的Tensor Processing Units:全部由台积电制造。
  • 与此同时,由GlobalFoundries和三星等竞争对手加入的台积电在新的制造流程中投入更多,这得益于前两个因素在良性循环中的收入。

英特尔的紧身衣

与此同时,英特尔采用了综合方法第一个主要的失误是移动:而不是简单地为iPhone制造ARM芯片the company presumed it could win by leveraging its manufacturing to create a more-efficient x86 chip; it was a decision that evinced too much knowledge of Intel’s margins and not nearly enough reflection on the importance of the integration between DOS/Windows and x86.

英特尔对非通用处理器采取了同样的错误做法,特别是图形:公司的Larrabee建筑was a graphics chip based on — you guessed it — x86; it was predicated on leveraging Intel’s integration, instead of actually meeting a market need一旦项目可以预见失败英特尔一瘸一拐地随着勉强满足通用显示的图形,和毫无价值的新兴的新用例。

然而,最新的危机是设计:AMD正在使用Ryzen处理器(由GlobalFoundries和台积电制造)进行真正的创新,而英特尔仍在销售Skylake,这是一个已有三年历史的设计Ashraf Eassa, with assistance from a since-deleted tweet from a former Intel engineer,解释发生了什么

根据前英特尔工程师Francois Piednoel的推文,该公司有机会将其全新的处理器技术设计引入其目前出货的14纳米技术,但管理层决定反对它。

我的帖子实际上指出市场停滞比Ryzen更麻烦,这不是一个好消息2年前,我说ICL应该采用14nm ++,每个人都看着我,就像我是块中最疯狂的人一样,以防万一......好吧......现在,他们知道了

-弗朗索瓦•Piednoel(@FPiednoel)2018年4月26日

近年来的问题是英特尔无法将其主要的新制造技术(称为10nm)投入批量生产与此同时,10nm的问题似乎让英特尔措手不及所以,很明显,10 nm的时候不会按计划投产,为时已晚,英特尔做这项工作带来的一个新的处理器设计最初是建立在10纳米技术开发的老14纳米技术……

What Piednoel is saying in the tweet I quoted above is that when management had the opportunity to start doing the work to bring their latest processor design, known as Ice Lake (abbreviated “ICL” in the tweet), [to the 14nm process] they decided against doing so这可能是因为管理层两年前真正相信英特尔的10纳米制造技术将在今天投入生产管理层赌注不正确,因此英特尔的产品组合将受到影响。

换句话说,英特尔的管理没有突破集成心态:设计和制造被认为永远同步。

整合与中断

或许更简单的说英特尔和微软一样,已经被打乱了该公司的集成模式多年来创造了令人难以置信的利润,每次有可能改变方法时,英特尔的高管都选择保留这些利润事实上,英特尔已经遵循了比微软更多的中断脚本:而PC的衰落最终导致了Windows的结束英特尔过去几年一直在通过越来越多地关注高端产品,向云提供商销售Xeon处理器来支撑其收益对于季度收益来说,这种方法肯定是有利的,但这意味着该公司只是在深化其所涉及的基本所有其他方面的漏洞而现在,最令人沮丧的是,即使在高端应用中,该公司也似乎即将失去其性能优势。

这一切都在Krzanich和他的前任保罗欧德宁身上Then again, perhaps neither had a choice: what makes disruption so devastating is the fact that, absent a crisis, it is almost impossible to avoidManagers are paid to leverage their advantages, not destroy them; to increase margins, not obliterate them文化更广泛的是一个组织的最大资产,直到它成为一个诅咒要求英特尔为其集成模型道歉在2018年令人满意,但对于它之前35年的成功和利润都不屑一顾。

就这样吧。

AT&T, Time Warner, and the Need for Neutrality

首先要了解联邦法官批准AT&T收购时代华纳的决定,以及美国的反对意见Department of Justice, is that it is very much in-line with the status quo: this is a vertical merger, and both the Department of Justice and the courts have defaulted towards approving such mergers for decades.1

Second, that there is an explosion of merger activity in and between the television production and distribution space is hardly a surprise: the Multichannel Video Programming Distributor (MVPD) business — that is, television distributed by cable, broadband, or satellite — has been shrinking for years now, and in a world where the addressable market is decreasing, the only avenues for growth are winning share from competitors, acquiring competitors, or vertically integrating.

Third, that last paragraph overstates the industry’s travails, at least in terms of television distribution, because most TV distributors are also internet service providers (ISPs), which means they are getting paid by consumers using the services disrupting MVPDs, including Netflix, Google, Facebook, and the Internet generally.

对于这个案例而言,令人不惊讶但又奇怪的是它在第二点上的争夺程度,对第三点的认可最少That is, it seems clear to me that AT&T made this acquisition with an eye on point number three, yet the government’s case was predicated on point number two; to that end, the government, in my eyes, rightly lost given the case they made他们是否应该失去一个更好的案件完全是另一个问题。

为什么AT&T买了时代华纳

What is the point of a merger, instead of a contract? This is a question that always looms large in any acquisition, particularly one of this size: AT&T is paying $85 billion for Time Warner, and that’s an awfully steep price to simply hang out with movie stars.

The standard explanation for most mergers is “synergies”, the idea that there are significant cost savings from combining the operations of two companies; the reason this explanation is popular is because saving money is not an issue for antitrust, while the corresponding possibility — charging higher prices by achieving a stronger market position through consolidation — is但是,这种解释通常适用于横向合并的情况,而不是像AT&T和时代华纳那样的垂直合并。

为此,AT&T在其中非常诚实新闻稿于2016年宣布合并2

“凭借出色的内容,您可以构建真正与众不同的视频服务,无论是传统电视,OTT还是移动电视我们的电视,移动和宽带分销以及直接的客户关系提供了独特的见解,我们可以提供可寻址的广告和更好的定制内容,“[AT&T首席执行官Randall]斯蒂芬森说“这是一种综合方法,我们相信它是随着时间推移而获胜的模式......

AT&T预计,在调整后的每股收益和每股自由现金流量结束后的第一年,该交易将实现增长......此外,AT&T预计该交易将改善其股息覆盖率并提升其收入和盈利增长情况。

从第二点:正如我当时指出的那样,它不是很性感,但对于34岁的AT&T来说这很重要红利贵族也就是说,标准普尔500指数中的一家公司将股息提高了25年或更长时间这是AT&T估值的核心部分,但该公司的自由现金流一直在努力跟上其股息增长的步伐时代华纳将在这方面做出重大贡献,就像之前收购DirecTV一样。

然而,这是第一个与此分析相关的观点:时代华纳如何让AT&T“构建真正差异化的视频服务”?

政府的案例

虽然AT&T新闻稿指出,那些“真正有区别的视频服务”可以通过传统的电视,奥特,或移动,政府的情况下是完全与传统电视有关该原始投诉声明:

如果允许这项合并继续进行,新合并的公司可能会 - 正如AT&T / DirecTV已经预测的那样 - 利用其对时代华纳流行节目的控制作为伤害竞争的武器AT&T/DirecTV would hinder its rivals by forcing them to pay hundreds of millions of dollars more per year for Time Warner’s networks, and it would use its increased power to slow the industry’s transition to new and exciting video distribution models that provide greater choice for consumers拟议的合并将减少美国家庭的创新产品和更高的账单。

这个想法是AT&T可以利用其对DirecTV的所有权来要求其他MVPD提高Turner网络的价格,因为如果MVPD拒绝付费,客户将被转为DirectTV问题是,很容易计算, this makes no economic sense: the amount of money AT&T would lose by blacking out Turner would almost certainly outweigh whatever gains it might accrue法官同意了,就是这样。

AT&T的真实目标

但请记住,AT&T没有将其选择限制在传统电视上:时代华纳内容为OTT和移动设备提供的可能性更具吸引力问题不在于AT&T可以做些什么来增加时代华纳内容的收入潜力(这是政府关注的焦点),而是时代华纳内容可以做些什么来增加AT&T服务的潜力,特别是移动。

请原谅长篇摘录,但我详细介绍了这个角度在每日更新中交易宣布时:

AT&T的核心无线业务正在饱和的市场竞争,增长前景渺茫苹果的礼物送给客户的无线产业要求高价数据计划已经基本结束,与AT&T也许最大的赢家:公司获得巨大的市场份额,即使增加了每用户平均收入近十年,主要归功于iPhone但现在,大多数人都拥有智能手机,更有针对性的是数据计划......

饱和市场的含义是增长越来越零,这为AT&T带来了问题和机遇The problem is primarily T-Mobile: fueled by the massive break-up fee paid by AT&T for the aforementioned failed acquisition, T-Mobile has embarked on an all-out assault against the incumbent wireless carriers, and AT&T has felt the pain the most, recording a negative net change in postpaid wireless customers for eight straight quarters不能或不愿意与t - mobile在价格上竞争,AT&T需要区分,理想情况下,不仅能避免损失,但实际上导致收益。

乍一看,这并不能解释时代华纳的收购:根据我的观点,上面是两个截然不同的公司,两个截然不同的内容战略观点订户(如AT&T)的零和竞争分销商有一个垂直的商业模式:理想情况下应该有分销商专有的服务和内容,从而保护客户Time Warner, though, is a content company, which means it has a horizontal business model: content is made once and then monetized across the broadest set of potential customers possible, taking advantage of content’s zero marginal costThe assumption of this sort of horizontal business model underlay Time Warner’s valuation; to suddenly make Time Warner’s content exclusive to AT&T would be massively value destructive (this is a reality often missed by suggestions that Apple, for example, should acquire content companies to differentiate its hardware).

然而,AT&T可能发现了一个漏洞:零评级Zero rating is often conflated with net neutrality, but unlike the latter, zero rating does not entail the discriminatory treatment of data; it just means that some data is free (sure, this is a violation of the的想法净中立,但这就是原因我很关键网络中立倡导者对数据的歧视性处理的狭隘关注AT&T是已经使用零评级来推动DirecTV

This is almost certainly the plan for Time Warner content as well: sure, it will continue to be available on all distributors, but if you subscribe to AT&T you can watch as much as you want for free; moreover, this offering is one that is strengthened by secular trends towards cord-cutting and mobile-only video consumption如果这些趋势继续沿着他们目前的方向发展,AT&T不仅会加强其针对T-Mobile的无线服务护城河,甚至可能开始抢占市场份额。

这一点从未出现在政府的案件中,而且,通过延伸,法官的裁决,确实令人震惊。

他指出,很奇怪为什么司法部起诉阻止这次收购:特朗普总统非常直言不讳地反对这项协议,甚至更直言不讳地反对他对时代华纳拥有的CNN的反感与此同时,领导此案的反托拉斯特助理检察长Makan Delrahim,没看到合并的问题在他被任命之前That the government’s complaint rested on both the most obvious angle and, from AT&T’s perspective, the least important, suggests a paucity of rigor in the prosecution of this case; it is very reasonable to wonder if the order to oppose the merger came from the top, and that the easiest case was the obvious out.

中立解决方案

Thus we are in the unfortunate scenario where a bad case by the government has led to, at best, a merger that was never examined for its truly anti-competitive elements, and at worst, bad law that will open the door for similar tie-upsTo be sure, it is not at all clear that the government would have won had they focused on zero rating: there is an obvious consumer benefit to the concept — that is why T-Mobile leveraged it to such great effect! — and the burden would have been on the government to show that the harm was greater.

然而,更大的问题是围绕这些问题的法律在多大程度上已经过时了去年秋天,我争辩说标题II是强制执行网络中立的错误框架,即使网络中立性我绝对支持的一个概念; I came to that position in part because zero rating was barely covered by the FCC’s action.3

显然需要的是新的立法,而不是试图以一种简单可逆的方式误用古代监管Moreover, AT&T has a point that online services like Google and Facebook are legitimate competitors, particularly for ad dollars; said regulation should address the entire sector为此我将专注于三个关键原则:

  • 首先,ISP不应故意在歧视的基础上减慢或阻止数据I am not necessarily opposed to the concept of “fast lanes”, as I believe that offers significant potential for innovative services, although I recognize the arguments against them; it should be non-negotiable, though, that ISPs cannot purposely disfavor certain types of content.
  • 其次,同样,不应允许主导互联网平台阻止其服务中的任何合法内容At the same time, services should have discretion in monetization and algorithms; that anyone should be able to put content on YouTube, for example, does not mean that one has a right to have Google monetize it on their behalf, or surface it to people not looking for it.
  • 第三,不应允许互联网服务提供商对自己的内容进行零评价,不应允许平台在其算法中优先考虑自己的内容Granted, this may be a bit extreme; at a minimum there should be strict rules and transparency around transfer pricing and a guarantee that the same rates are allowed to competitive services and content.

正如所指出的那样,互联网的现实聚合理论, is increased centralization; meanwhile, the impact on the Internet on traditional media is an inexorable drive towards consolidation我们目前的法律和反托拉斯法律处理,这一现实,和一个新的法律保证中立是最好的解决方案。

  1. 纵向合并是否不具有反竞争性的假设是值得的,尽管是单独的讨论[↩︎]
  2. 公平地说,该公司还提到了协同效应,但这并不是新闻稿的重点[↩︎]
  3. FCC表示会这样做把它个案并且在奥巴马政府日渐衰落的日子里争辩说,AT&T显然试图对自己的服务进行零评级是违规行为,但这种情况从未在法庭上进行过测试,并且很快被推迟[↩︎]

踏板车经济

根据我的理解,打开一篇关于电动滑板车的文章的正确方法是首先陈述一个人的前辈,解释一个人如何来尝试滑板车的情况,然后做出判决不幸的是,这意味着我的有点无聊:而大多数人采用这种格式想恨他们1我非常确定踏板车会很棒 - 他们就是!2

For me the circumstances were a trip to San Francisco; I purposely stayed at a hotel relatively far from where most of my meetings were, giving me no choice but to rely on some combination of scooters, e-bikes, and ride-sharing services滑板车是一个明显的赢家:快速,有趣,方便 - 只要你能找到附近的一个这个城市需要五倍的数量。

所以,很自然地,旧金山禁止他们, at least temporarily: companies will be able to apply for their share of a pool of a mere 1,250 permits; that number may double in six months, but for now the scooter-riding experience will probably be more of a novelty, not something you can rely on事实上,在我旅行结束时,如果我真的匆忙,我知道要使用乘车共享服务。

乘坐共享服务具有更高的流动性并不奇怪:旧金山是一个对汽车友好的城镇该市人口为884,363人,人口为496,843人车辆,大多在该市的275,000路边停车位当然,Uber和Lyft的大部分司机来自城外,但没有拥堵税来阻止他们。

The result is an urban area stuck on a bizarre local maxima: most households have cars, but rarely use them, particularly in the city, because traffic is bad and parking is — relative to the number of cars — sparse; the alternative is ride-sharing, which incurs the same traffic costs but at least doesn’t require parking然而,现在无论如何,旧金山只允许大约60个停车位 - 街头滑行车。

一切都是服务

This is hardly the forum to discuss the oft-head-scratching politics of tech’s de facto capital city, and I can certainly see the downside of scooters, particularly the haphazard way with which they are being deployed; in an environment built for cars scooters get in the way.

但是,值得考虑的是,没有码头的踏板车有多大意义:这个概念是我在2016年提到的最纯粹的表现形式之一一切都是服务

What happens, though, if we apply the services business model to hardware? Consider an airplane: I fly thousands of miles a year, but while Stratechery is doing well, I certainly don’t own my own plane! Rather, I fly on an airplane that is owned by an airline that is paid for in part through some percentage of my ticket cost我实际上是“租用”那架飞机上的一个座位,一旦那次飞行消失,除了手机上的新GPS坐标之外,我什么也没有。

现在购买机票的过程,确定我是谁,等等麻烦远比简单地跳跃在我的车,有重大的交易成本,但考虑到我买不起一架飞机值得忍受当我不得不长途跋涉吗What happens, though, when those transaction costs are removed? Well, then you get Uber or its competitors: simply touch a button and a car that would have otherwise been unused will pick you up and take you where you want to go, for a price that is a tiny fraction of what the car cost to buy in the first place同样的模式适用于酒店 - 而不是在您访问的每个城市购买房屋,只需租用房间 - 而Airbnb通过利用未使用的空间将概念提升到一个新的水平。

The enabling factor for both Uber and Airbnb applying a services business model to physical goods is your smartphone and the Internet: it enables distribution and transactions costs to be zero, making it infinitely more convenient to simply rent the physical goods you need instead of acquiring them outright.

What is striking about dockless scooters — at least when one is parked outside your door! — is that they make ride-sharing services feel like half-measures: why even wait five minutes, when you can just scan-and-go? Steve Jobs described computers as心灵的自行车; now that computers are smartphones and connected to the Internet they can conjure up the physical equivalent as well!

事实上,唯一可以让体验更好的东西 - 骑手和其他人 - 将是专用车道,例如,旧金山900英里的停车位To be sure, the city isn’t going to make the conversion overnight, or, given the degree to which San Francisco is in thrall to homeowners, probably ever, but that is particularly a shame in 2018: venture capitalists are willing to fund the entire thing, and I’m not entirely sure why.

失踪的护城河

Late last month came word that Sequoia Capital was leading a $150 million funding round for Bird, one of the electric scooter companies, valuing the company at $1 billion; a week later came reports that GV was leading a $250 million investment in rival Lime.

其中一个有趣的花絮Axios的报道on the latter was that each Lime scooter is used on average between 8 and 12 times a day; plugging that number into这个非常有用的滑板车共享单位成本分析这表明两家创业公司的经济实力都非常强劲(当然投资的规模 - 以及投资者的质量 - 表明相同)。

The key word in that sentence, though, is “both”: what, precisely, might make Bird and Lime, or any of their competitors, unique? Or, to put it in business parlance, where is the moat? This is where the comparison to ride-sharing services is particularly instructive; I explained早在2014年为什么有更多的护城河的比大多数人认为的拥有权:

  • 司机和车手之间有一个双面网络
  • 作为一个服务收益份额,其效用的增加司机将限制流动性服务,支持更大的球员
  • 乘客将所有条件相同的情况下,使用一个服务习惯

This leads to winner-take-all dynamics in a particular geographic area; then, when it comes times to launch in new areas, travelers and brand will give the larger service a head start.

To be sure, these interactions are complicated, and not everything is equal (see, for example, the huge amounts of share Lyft took last year thanks to Uber’s self-inflicted crises)It is that complication, though, and the fact it is exponentially more difficult to build a two-sided network (instead of, say, plopping a bunch of scooters on the street), that creates the conditions for a moat: the entire point of a moat is that it is hard to build.

优步的自驾错误

这就是我的原因长期坚持这是第二大错误3前优步首席执行官特拉维斯卡兰尼克(Travis Kalanick)所做的就是该公司率先投入自动驾驶汽车从表面层面来看,逻辑是显而易见的:优步的最大成本是驾驶员,这意味着摆脱它们是获利的一条简单途径 - 或者,如果其他人首先部署自动驾驶汽车,那么优步可能会在价格上受到削弱。

卡兰尼克思想中的错误有两方面:

  • 首先,up-and-until,自动驾驶汽车随处可见,不仅发明,但构建和部署规模——超级的司机是它最大的竞争优势卡兰尼克关于此事的公开声明几乎没有表明对这一点的理解。
  • Second, bringing self-driving cars to market would entail huge amounts of capital investmentFor one, this means it would be unlikely that Google, a company that rushes to reassure investors when it loses tens of basis points in margin, would do so by itself, and for another, whatever companies did make such an investment would be highly incentivized to maximize utilization of said investment as soon as possible这意味着插入占主导地位的运输即服务网络,这意味着与优步合作。

My contention is that Uber would have been best-served concentrating all of its resources on its driver-centric model, even as it built relationships with everyone in the self-driving space, positioning itself to be the best route to customers for whoever wins the self-driving technology battle.

优步的第二次机会

有趣的是,滑板车和他们密切相关的堂兄,电动自行车,可能会让优步第二次有机会做到这一点没有双边网络效应,自驾车和电动自行车的潜在护城河相对较弱:专利技术最多可能提供短暂的优势,而Bird和Lime则拥有充足的资金支持两者都在尝试“收费共享”,其中他们付钱给人们在他们的家中为踏板车充电,但两者都增加了他们自己的承包商,以充电车辆并将他们移动到需求高的地区。

仍然不被重视的是习惯:您的典型技术第一采用者可能没有问题检查多个应用程序以赶上快速骑行,但我怀疑大多数骑手更喜欢使用他们已经拥有的相同的应用程序To that end, there is certainly a strong impetus for Bird and Lime to spread to new cities, simply to get that first-app-installed advantage, but this is where Uber has the biggest advantage of all: the millions of people who already have the Uber app.

为此,我想优步收购Jump Bikeswas a good idea, and scooters should be next (an acquisition of Bird or Lime may already be too pricey, but Jump has a strong technical team that should be able to get an Uber-equivalent out the door soon)The Uber app already handles multiple kinds of rides; it is a small step to handling multiple kinds of transportation — a smaller step than installing yet another app.

更多的科技盈余

更一般地说,在一切都是服务的世界里,公司可能不得不适应比他们想要的更浅的护城河如果你眯着眼睛,我推荐的优步看起来有点像传统的消费性包装商品(CPG)战略:控制分配(货架空间|屏幕空间)与一些主导产品(例如TIDE | UberX) that provide leverage for new offerings (e.gSwiffer | Jump Bikes)模型不是那么强,但可能会有其他潜在投资锁定期,尤其是独家合同与城市和大学。

Still, that is hardly the sort of dominance that accrues to digital-only aggregators like Facebook or Google, or even Netflix; the physical world is much harder to monopolize一切都将作为服务提供,意味着广泛地提高社会效率 - 更多人可以获得更多产品以降低总体成本 - 即使挖掘护城河的难度意味着大部分效率变为消费者剩余而且,只要风险资本家愿意买单,旧金山这样的城市就应该占据优势。

我写了一篇关于这篇文章的后续文章这个每日更新

  1. That article is perhaps more revealing than the author appreciated [↩︎]
  2. Note: this article is going to focus on San Francisco for simplicity’s sake, although the broader points have nothing to do with San Francisco specifically; I am aware that the transportation situation is different in different cities — I do live in a different country, after all, in a city with fantastic public transportation and a plethora of personal transportation options[↩︎]
  3. 第一个不是购买Lyft [↩︎]

开发人员的成本

昨天看到三个与开发者有关的公告,其中两个来自Apple,一个来自微软前者是Apple年度全球开发者大会的一部分基调

  • iOS App Store将于下个月满10岁,每周为5亿访客提供服务,截至本周晚些时候,开发商将获得超过1000亿美元的收入。
  • 明年为Mac开发者可以编写应用程序使用iOS用户界面框架(称为UIKit)。

与此同时,微软也是如此在三年内第二次通过大规模收购,超越了Apple的主题演讲从该公司的新闻稿

微软公司周一宣布已达成收购GitHub的协议,GitHub是全球领先的软件开发平台,超过2800万开发人员学习,分享和协作创造未来两家公司将共同使开发人员能够在开发生命周期的每个阶段实现更多目标,加速GitHub的企业使用,并将Microsoft的开发人员工具和服务带给新的受众。

微软首席执行官萨蒂亚·纳德拉说:“微软是开发商第一家公司,通过与GitHub合作,我们加强了对开发人员自由,开放和创新的承诺。”“我们认识到我们对此协议承担的社区责任,并将尽最大努力使每个开发人员能够建立,创新和解决世界上最紧迫的挑战。”

根据协议条款,微软将以75亿美元的价格收购GitHub。

开发人员实际上是非常昂贵的!

平台 - 开发者共生

过去几周,特别是在比尔盖茨线, I have been exploring the differences between aggregators and platforms; while aggregators generally harvest already produced content or goods, developers leverage the platform to create something entirely new.

平台促进聚合器中间

这导致了开发人员和平台之间的共生:从技术角度来看,平台提供了基本的构建模块(即开发人员构建新体验所必需的应用程序接口或API,从营销角度来看,这些新体验为客户提供了首先购买平台或升级的理由。

The degree to which applications drive adoption of the underlying platform can, of course, vary; unsurprisingly the monetization potential of the platform relative to developers varies in a correlated wayTraditional Windows, for example, provided very little end user functionality; what made it so valuable were all of the applications built on top of its open platform.

Windows是一个开放的平台

这里的“开放”意味着两件事:首先,任何人都可以使用Windows API,两个开发人员直接与最终用户建立关系,包括付款这导致了许多大型软件公司,并在2003年,在Windows上创建了一个平台:Valve的Steam。

What Valve realized is that playing a game is only one part of the overall customer experience; the experience of discovering and buying the game matters as well, as does the installation and upgrade processMoreover, these customer pain points were developer pain points as well; the original impetus to develop Steam, for example, was the difficulty in getting players to upgrade en masse, something that was essential for games in which players competed online而且,尽管Valve是一家私营公司,并且从未公布过Steam的收入数据,但报告显示该平台产生了每年数十亿美元

不过即使这样,相比iOS应用程序商店:苹果把蒸汽的应用商店想法和集成的平台,这样iOS用户和开发者别无选择,只能使用苹果公司拥有并经营的分销渠道,与所有的各种限制和成本- 30%,精确,这意味着。

iPhone平台带有中介层

苹果首先能够做到这一点,因为潜在的产品——iPhone和iPad激发自身的需求,独立于应用程序Apple拥有开发者需要赚钱的用户。

其次,App Store和之前的Steam一样,确实是一种更好的体验,可以促使最终用户进行更多的下载和购买这意味着开发iOS不仅仅吸引用户的数量,还因为这些用户是愿意购买超过他们会在另一个平台。

第三 - 这也适用于Steam - App Store大大降低了开发人员的准入门槛; this led to more apps, which attracted more users, which led to more apps, both locking in apps as a competitive advantage and also ensuring that no one app had outsized power (leaving Apple free to通过命令限制类似蒸汽的竞争对手)。

Apple的平台公告

这构成了我上面提到的两个Apple公告从iOS开发人员获得1000亿美元的消息开始:这意味着Apple已经收集了大约400亿美元,而且开销率非常高。

此外,Apple的绝大多数公告都是与这些开发者竞争的:第一个新的应用宣布,测量, should immediately wipe out the only obviously useful Augmented Reality apps in the storeApple also announced a new Podcasts app for Watch, update News, Stocks, and Voice Memo apps, and the only third party demos were about how one of the largest software companies there is — Adobe — would be supporting Apple’s preferred 3D-image formatAnd why not! The implication of owning all of those high-value users is that, on iOS anyways, developers are cheap.

The Mac, though, is a different story: the platform is far smaller than the iPhone; that there remain a number of high quality independent software vendors supporting the Mac is a testament to how valuable it is for developers to be able to build direct relationships with customers that can span years and multiple transactionsStill, there seems little question that the number of Mac apps is, if not trending in the wrong direction, certainly not growing in any meaningful way; there simply aren’t enough users to entice developers.

这意味着苹果的方法必须非常不同于iOS:开发人员而不是颐指气使,苹果宣布将在多年的项目更容易iOS应用程序移植到MacThis is, in a fashion, Apple paying for Mac apps; no, the money isn’t going to developers, but Apple is voluntarily taking on a much greater portion of the porting workload当您没有几乎同样多的用户时,开发人员会更加昂贵。

GitHub的成本

尽管如此,无论苹果建立这个移植框架的成本是多少,它肯定要低于75亿美元,这是微软为GitHub付出的代价。乍一看,可能还不清楚比较点是什么。

Go back to Windows: Microsoft had to do very little to convince developers to build on the platform事实上,即使在微软反托拉斯问题的高峰时期,开发人员仍然以压倒性优势继续支持该平台,原因很明显:所有用户都是换句话说,对于Windows,开发人员很便宜。

That is no longer the case today: Windows remains an important platform in the enterprise and for gaming (although Steam, much to Microsoft’s chagrin, takes a good amount of the platform profit there), but the company has no platform presence in mobile, and is in second place in the cloudMoreover, that second place is largely predicated on shepherding existing corporate customers to cloud computing; it is not clear why any new company — or developer — would choose Microsoft.

这是上下文考虑收购GitHub:缺乏吸引开发者的平台有足够的用户,微软“收购”开发者直接通过优越的工具,现在,GitHub,优越的云提供一个有意义的网络效应The problem is that acquiring developers in this way, without the leverage of users, is extraordinarily expensive; it is very hard to imagine GitHub ever generating the sort of revenue that justifies this purchase price.

Again, though, GitHub revenue is not the point; Microsoft has plenty of revenue它还有一个潜在的致命弱点:没有基于用户杠杆的平台Instead Microsoft is betting that a future of open-source, cloud-based applications that exist independent of platforms will be a large-and-increasing share of the future, and that there is room in that future for a company to win by offering a superior user experience for developers directly, not simply exerting leverage on them.

顺便说一句,这正是微软成为GitHub最佳收购者的原因,GitHub已经筹集了3.5亿美元的风险资本,可能不会将其作为一个独立的实体Any company with a platform with a meaningful amount of users would find it very hard to resist the temptation to use GitHub as leverage; on the other side of the spectrum, purely enterprise-focused companies like IBM or Oracle would be tempted to wring every possible bit of profit out of the company.

微软想要的更加模糊:它希望成为开发者的朋友,这在很大程度上是因为它没有其他选择从长远来看,尤其如此Windows继续褪色,该公司将更多地投资于一个没有看门人的世界,开发者工具和云通过更好的优点赢得胜利,而不是通过利用用户。

That, though, is exactly why Microsoft had to pay so much: buying in directly is a whole lot more expensive than using leverage, which can produce equivalent — or better! — returns for much less investment.

比尔盖茨线

其中两个更着名的军事说法是“将军们总是准备战斗最后一场战争”,并且“在他犯错误时永远不要打断你的敌人。”我在结束时想到了后者。上周日关于谷歌的60分钟报道

谷歌拒绝了我们对其中一位高管的采访请求,但在对我们的问题的书面回应中,该公司否认它是搜索或搜索广告的垄断,引用包括亚马逊和Facebook在内的许多竞争对手它表示它不会改变其算法以使竞争对手处于劣势,并且“我们的责任是为我们的用户提供最好的结果,而不是我们结果中的网站的特定展示位置我们知道这些网站的排名下降会不开心,可能公开抱怨。”

The 60 Minutes report was not exactly fair-and-balanced; it featured an anti-tech-monopoly crusader1,一个反技术垄断活动家,一个反技术垄断监管机构和Yelp首席执行官Jeremy Stoppelman而且,似乎不太可能是巧合,Yelp本周在欧盟提出了新的反托拉斯投诉针对谷歌To be sure, just because a report was biased does not mean it was wrong; while我对欧盟针对谷歌购物的反托拉斯案持怀疑态度开放的情况下对安卓很明确的但是,Yelp并不是直接关注的问题。

Yelp对谷歌的案例

这是来自有关60分钟功能的博文

Yelp确实参与了这篇文章,因为谷歌正在做出“尽可能提供最佳结果”的反面,而是将自己的内容赋予非法优势我们制作了一个视频来准确解释Google如何将自己的兴趣放在本地搜索的消费者之前,您可以在此处观看:

Yelp’s position, at least in this video, appears to be that Google’s answer box is anticompetitive because it only includes reviews and ratings from Google; presumably the situation could be resolved were Google to use sources like Yelp但是,这个论点存在三个问题:

  • First, the answer box originally included content scraped from sources like Yelp and other vertical search sites; under来自FTC的压力由于Yelp和其他垂直搜索引擎的投诉,谷歌同意在2013年停止这样做。2
  • Second, in a telling testament to the power of being on top of search results, Google’s ratings and reviews have improved considerably in the two years since that video was posted; this isn’t a static market (to be sure, this is an argument that could be used on both sides).
  • 第三 - 这就是本文的重点--Yelp似乎想要的仅仅是为了让Google更强大。

难怪谷歌拒绝接受采访的要求。

比尔盖茨线

Over the last few weeks I have been exploring what differences there are between platforms and aggregators, and was reminded of this anecdote from Chamath Palihapitiya in采访塞米尔沙阿

Semil Shah:您是否看到Facebook在Facebook平台和连接时的任何相似之处,以及Uber如何增强他们的平台?

Chamath:它们都不是平台它们有点像这些滑稽的努力,将你作为第N个优先事项我负责Facebook平台我们大肆吹嘘它就像是一些热门的大事And I remember when we raised money from Bill Gates, 3 or 4 months after — like our funding history was $5M, $83 M, $500M, and then $15B当Facebook平台和盖茨说出一些事情之后几个月就发生了这个15B,“那是一堆屎这不是一个平台平台是指使用它的每个人的经济价值超过创造它的公司的价值然后是一个平台。“

By this measure Windows was indeed the ultimate platform — the company used to brag about only capturing a minority of the total value of the Windows ecosystem — and the operating system’s clear successors are Amazon Web Services and Microsoft’s own Azure Cloud Services在所有这三种情况下,都有强大而持久的业务。

平台企业绘图吸引第三方客户
科技的两个哲学

然而,一旦平台在比尔盖茨线下萎缩,建立在“平台”上的企业的长期潜力开始下降例如,Apple的App Store具有平台的所有特征,但Apple非常清楚地捕获了整个生态系统的绝大部分,这既是因为iPhone的盈利能力,也是因为它对App Store经济的控制; the paucity of strong and durable businesses on the App Store is a natural outgrowth of that.

App Store中间体第三方和用户

请注意,Apple控制其开发人员经济状况的能力来自于中介这些开发人员与客户的关系。

聚合器,而不是平台

Facebook和谷歌将这种中介发挥到了极致,利用他们的能力,广泛发现其网络和互联网上丰富的信息:

绘图聚合器的客户关系和供应商跟进
在聚合器业务模型中,聚合器拥有客户和供应商

因此,Facebook和谷歌的“平台”不仅不符合比尔盖茨线,他们甚至没有在图表上注册:它们是聚合器的最纯粹表达从我的原始配方

互联网的根本性破坏是将这种动态变为现实First, the Internet has made distribution (of digital goods) free, neutralizing the advantage that pre-Internet distributors leveraged to integrate with suppliers其次,互联网使交易成本为零,使得分销商可以大规模地向最终用户/消费者推进。

This has fundamentally changed the plane of competition: no longer do distributors compete based upon exclusive supplier relationships, with consumers/users an afterthought相反,供应商可以按比例汇总,将消费者/用户作为第一优先顺序By extension, this means that the most important factor determining success is the user experience: the best distributors/aggregators/market-makers win by providing the best experience, which earns them the most consumers/users, which attracts the most suppliers, which enhances the user experience in a virtuous cycle.

结果预测价值的转变保护有吸引力的利润Previous incumbents, such as newspapers, book publishers, networks, taxi companies, and hoteliers, all of whom integrated backwards, lose value in favor of aggregators who aggregate modularized suppliers — which they often don’t pay for — to consumers/users with whom they have an exclusive relationship at scale.

这最终是平台和聚合器之间最重要的区别:平台是强大的,因为它们促进a relationship between 3rd-party suppliers and end users; aggregators, on the other hand, intermediate and control it.

此外,至少在Facebook和谷歌的情况下,它们各自价值链中的整合点是网络效应这就是我上周想要获得的护城河地图我讨论了网络效应的内在化:

  • 谷歌拥有在环境中运营的奢侈品 - 万维网 - 默认情况下完全开放That let the best technology win, and that win was augmented by the data that comes from serving an ever-increasing portion of the market最终结果是最终用户的整合和数据反馈周期使Google搜索越多越好。
  • Facebook’s differentiator, meanwhile, is the relationships between friends and family; the company has subsequently integrated that network effect with consumer attention, forcing all of the content providers to jostle for space in the Newsfeed as pure commodities.

It’s worth noting, by the way, why it was that Facebook could come to be a rival to Google in the first place; specifically, Facebook拥有独家数据- 这些关系以及Facebook网站上的所有行为 - 谷歌无法实现换句话说,Facebook不是成为谷歌的一部分,而是完全分开。

在聚合世界中取得成功

这就解释了为什么我发现Yelp的抱怨不仅仅是重点:该公司似乎正在花费大量精力来重新获得向Yelp提供内容的权利Yelp努力获取当然,就像一般商品的生产一样,那里有收入,但如果没有可持续的成本优势,那么它不是建立强大和耐用业务的最佳途径。

Of course that is the bigger problem: I noted above that Google’s library of ratings and reviews has grown substantially over the past few years; users generating content are the ultimate low-cost supplier, and losing that supply to Google is arguably a bigger problem for Yelp than whatever advertising revenue it can wring out from people that would click through on a hypothetical Google Answer Box that used 3rd-party sourcesAnd, it should be noted, that Yelp’s entire business is user-generated reviews: they and similar vertical sites are likely to do a far better job of generating, organizing, and curating such data.

Still, I can’t help but wonder whether or not Yelp’s problem is not that Google is using its own content in the Answer Box, but rather the Answer Box itself; which of these set of results would be better for Yelp’s business, even in a hypothetical world where Answer Box content comes from Yelp?

没有答案框Yelp将获得更多的访问者

Presuming that the answer is the image on the right — driving users to Yelp is both better for the bottom line and better for content generation, which mostly happens on the desktop — and it becomes clear that Yelp’s biggest problem is that the more useful Google is — even if it only ever uses Yelp’s data! — the less viable Yelp’s business becomes这正是您在聚合器主导的价值链中所期望的:聚合器完全中断供应商并将其减少为商品。

为此,这就是为什么最佳战略需要完全避开谷歌和Facebook的商业模式:亚马逊就是其中之一上个月停止购买Google购物广告,公司可以负担得起的事情一半的购物者在亚马逊上开始他们的产品搜索可以肯定的是,亚马逊本身是足够强大的,但这是一个难以忽视的例子谷歌最喜欢的说法,“竞争只是一个点击之外。”

Yelp与谷歌相关

Still, I have sympathy for Yelp’s position; Stoppelman told 60 Minutes:

如果我今天开始,我将没有建立Yelp的镜头这个机会已经被谷歌和关闭他们的方法,因为如果你的这些类别提供伟大的内容在一个利润丰厚的谷歌,和被视为具有潜在威胁,他们会消灭你。

Stoppelman is right, but the reason is perhaps less nefarious than it seems; the 60 Minutes report explained why in the voiceover:

Yelp和无数其他网站依靠谷歌为他们带来网络流量 - 为他们的广告商提供眼球。

像其他许多评论网站Yelp,根深蒂固在SEO搜索引擎优化他们的整个业务长期以谷歌为他们的客户收购为基础对于公司来说,它已经成为一个知名品牌,现在通过其移动应用程序获得约70%的访问量这些访问非常在我上面强调的亚马逊模型中:用户直接访问Yelp并直接绕过Google。

That, though, isn’t great for Google! It seems a bit rich that Yelp should be free to leverage its app to avoid Google completely, and yet demand that Google continue to feature Yelp prominently in its search results, particularly on mobile, where the Answer Box has particular utility我知道Yelp感觉谷歌已经改变了Yelp在2004年成立时的交易条款,但现实是真正重要的变化是移动。

我觉得引人注目的是一个新的视频that Yelp put out yesterday; while it makes many of the same points as the one above, instead of being focused on regulators it is targeting Google itself, arguing that Google isn’t living up to its own standards by not featuring the best results, and not driving traffic back to sites that make the content Google needs (by, for example, not including prominent links to the content filling its answer boxes; Yelp isn’t asking that they go away, just that they drive traffic to 3rd parties)谷歌可能是一个聚合器,但它仍然需要供应,这意味着它需要一个可持续的开放网络公司应该倾听。

Facebook和数据可移植性

Facebook,不幸的是,供应商面临着没有这样的限制:确实是有区别的内容是由Facebook的用户,并全资拥有的FacebookFacebook is even further from the Bill Gates Line than Google is: the latter at least needs commoditized suppliers; the former can take or leave them on a whim, and does.

这就是为什么我已经意识到一个受欢迎的处方Facebook的主导地位,本周数据便携性,提出一个进步联盟组织在伞下免于Facebook,错了。3The problem with data portability is that it goes both ways: if you can take your data out of Facebook to other applications, you can do the same thing in the other direction那么,问题是哪个实体可能在数据方面具有更大的重心:Facebook,其社交网络,或几乎其他任何东西?

Facebook处于数据交​​换的中心
Facebook品牌

记住导致Facebook崛起的条件:公司能够规避谷歌,直接转向用户,并建立一个搜索公司无法触及的围墙数据库与比尔盖茨线以下的公司合作或互操作,特别是聚合器,只是邀请进行中介要求政府执行的确是一个只会帮助Facebook的错误。4


The broader takeaway is that distinguishing between platforms and aggregators isn’t simply an academic exercise: it should affect how companies think about their competitive environment vis-à-vis the biggest companies in tech, and, just as importantly, it should weigh heavily on regulatorsThe Microsoft antitrust battles of the 2000s were in many respects about enforcing interoperability as a way of breaking into the Microsoft platform; today antitrust should be far more concerned about aggregators capturing everything they touch by virtue of their control of end users.

That’s the thing about the “Generals fight the last war” saying; it’s usually applied to the losing side that made mistake after mistake while the victors leveraged the new world order.

我写了一篇关于这篇文章的后续文章这个每日更新

  1. 我已经讨论过为什么我不同意Gary Reback关于垄断和创新的看法这个每日更新[↩︎]
  2. 关于FTC的决定,是的,正如华尔街日报报道的那样, some FTC staff members recommended suing Google; what is not true is that the recommendation was unanimous, or that FTC commissioners ultimately deciding to go in another direction was unusual事实上,其他团体的其他工作人员团队建议反对该诉讼,而FTC委员的决定是一致的同样,这并不是说这是正确的决定,而是流行的概念 - 包括60分钟片段中报道的内容 - 有点偏离[↩︎]
  3. 公平起见,我提出了同样的论点以前,但我改变了主意[↩︎]
  4. 该集团要求Facebook被迫剥离Instagram,WhatsApp和Messenger在这个框架方面更有意义(除了Messenger,它一直是Facebook的一部分)我坚信聚合器的最佳反垄断补救措施是限制收购[↩︎]