优步的捆绑

有了优步,没有什么比这更容易了。

从盈利能力开始,或缺乏盈利能力:两周前该公司报告其季度“收入”,1损失是巨大的:8.91亿美元,收入28亿美元显然业务失败了,不是吗?

好吧,就像我说的那样,并不容易:不像公司像MoviePass优步拥有积极的单位经济学 - 也就是说,公司在每次旅行中赚钱这很直观:优步保持在每种票价的20%-30%之间,2从中支付保险费,信用卡费等,并保留其余部分。3根据上一季度的数据,“其余”总计15亿美元,毛利率为55%(优步总预订量的13%)Moreover, margin is improving — it was 47% a year ago — mostly because Uber is managing to both take a higher percentage of fares even as it has reduced its spending on promotions and driver incentives (Cost of Revenue, meanwhile, appears to correspond very closely to gross bookings).

优步的问题很简单:首先,该公司继续花费大量资金支付“线下”成本:22亿美元用于运营和支持,销售和营销,4研发,一般和行政,折旧和摊销其次,该公司改善利润率的很大一部分似乎源于退出更加困难的市场,如俄国东南亚而不是美国,欧洲和大洋洲核心市场的改善最关心的是,Lyft似乎已经超过Uber了

优步的Lyft问题

对于优步与车手,投资者和司机来说,Lyft是一个问题。

从骑手的角度来看,Lyft毫不奇怪地受益于自我造成的灾难是2017年(虽然公平地说,2017年是已经出现问题的一年多年)The consumer benefit of services like Uber and Lyft has always been clear, and Uber’s aggressive expansion paid off when the service became the default choice for a large portion of the market, something that is critical for a commodity offering with two-sided network effectsThe problem is that Uber gave riders plenty of reasons to question their default choice with not just a sexual harassment scandal, and not just a lawsuit alleging the theft of intellectual property from Google, and not just allegations of brazenly circumventing local regulators, but all three (and honestly, this understates things).

This was particularly problematic because that two-sided network effect wasn’t that strong: sure, Uber was more likely to monopolize driver time given its larger user base, but as long as drivers are independent contractors Uber can’t do anything to prevent them from multihoming, that is, being available on both Uber and Lyft’s networks at the same timeLyft已经准备好吸收不满意的Uber车手,因为他们实际上正在使用Uber的司机来容纳他们。

时机不可能更糟糕:仅仅几个月之前Lyft似乎是出售无法找到买家; it seemed that former-CEO Travis Kalanick was going to win one of his biggest gambles, turning down an offer to acquire Lyft in 2014 in exchange for 18% of Uber.

It proved to be Kalanick’s biggest mistake, at least from a business perspective: within weeks of the Uber scandal explosion Lyft筹集了6亿美元,一个月后与Waymo建立了合作伙伴关系,谷歌的自动驾驶汽车公司Suddenly the best way to invest in the most promising self-driving technology was Lyft; unsurprisingly Lyft has since raised an additional $2.3 billion, including an investment from Google Capital.

优步的竞争环境

这个背景很重要的原因是,对优步的业务的正确分析今天与两年前根本不同 - 或者四年前我写的时候为什么优步打架That is when I made the argument that even though Uber’s two-sided network effects were relatively weak thanks to the lack of driver lock-in, the fact that ride-sharing was a commodity market meant its head start and brand would lead to slow-but-steady growth in marketshare, eventually starving Lyft due to an inability to raise funds based on increasingly inferior financial results.

我坚持这样的分析:这正是发生的事情,优步非常接近将Lyft击败At the same time, it is also no longer applicable, because Lyft no longer has any problem raising money, while Uber appears to be having a hard time holding onto its market share (as an indirect indicator of Uber’s waning power with consumers, note Uber’s最近无力打败纽约的乘车共享上限做完之后三年前)为此,Lyft在可预见的未来出现在市场中的前景意味着Uber需要一种新策略,而不仅仅是简单地挤压Lyft干燥。

欢迎来到捆绑,优步风格。

优步的消费者套餐:交通即服务

优步首席执行官Dara Khosrowshahi为Uber应用程序提出了新的愿景采访Kara Swisher今年早些时候在代码会议上:

DK:我们正在考虑其他交通方式如果你看看Jump,Uber收购了无船坞自行车公司今年早些时候,Jump的平均行程长度为2.6英里也就是说,我们在旧金山旅行的30%到40%是2.6英里或更少跳转比购买UberX便宜得多To some extent it’s like, “Hey, let’s cannibalize ourselves.” Let’s create a cheaper form of transportation from A to B, and for you to come to Uber, and Uber not just being about cars, and Uber not being about what the best solution for us is, but really being about the best solution for here.

KS:所以自行车,滑板车?

DK:自行车,也许是滑板车我想打开公交网络我想把BART或地铁等送到优步所以,任何方式让你从A点到B点。

KS:Wait, you wanna start your own BART? No.

DK:不不不我们不会垂直的就像亚马逊销售第三方商品一样,我们也将提供第三方运输服务所以,我们想要成为亚马逊的交通工具,我们希望提供BART作为替代方案有一家名为Masabi的公司将Metro等连接到支付系统So we want you to be able to say, “Should I take the BART? Should I take a bike? Should I take an Uber?” All of it to be real-time information, all of it to be optimized for you, and all of it to be done with the push of a button.

KS:那么,任何运输?

DK:任何运输,完全无摩擦,实时。

In case you had any question about how serious Khosrowshahi is about the concept, he told the金融时报在接受采访时说昨天:

在高峰时段,一吨重的金属块可以让一个人占用10个街区......我们能够以一种对用户来说是一种胜利的方式塑造行为这是城市的胜利短期的财务状况,也许这对我们来说不是一场胜利,但从战略上看,我们认为这正是我们想要领导的地方......

我们愿意为短期的单位经济学换取长期更高的参与度......我发现在我的职业生涯中,长期的参与会赢得战争,有时为了赢得战争而失去战斗是值得的。

这是一个捆绑,并且像任何捆绑从长远来看,经济学的作用是从消费者那里获得更大的总支出,即使他们在任何特定项目上花费更少To that end, as Khosrowshahi notes, the real enemy is the car in the garage; to the extent Uber can replace它的机会越大。

优步的消费者捆绑

此外,优步可以通过构建此类服务所固有的复杂性来处理最终用户的所有运输需求,更为坚固的优步成为消费者当然,Lyft承诺建立同样的东西,但优步领先一步,仍然拥有更大的战争胸膛,这可能证明在土地抢夺方面更有帮助,而不是目前的消耗战Moreover, Uber still has a significant geographic advantage over Lyft, which only刚开始在国际上扩展,使其成为旅行者的更好选择。

优步的驱动程序包:优步吃

与此同时,Uber Eats有可能成为一个非常有吸引力的企业:Khosrowshahi在Code Conference上说that the business has “a $6 billion bookings run rate, growing over 200 percent.” Uber takes 30% of that ($1.6 billion), as well as a $5 delivery fee from customers, out of which it pays drivers a pickup fee, drop-off fee, and per-mile rate (of which it keeps 25%);根据The Information, the service isn’t making money yet, but it is much more profitable than Uber’s ride-sharing business was at a similar scale.

暂且不谈司机,这是一个经典之作聚合在拥有消费者需求的过程中,优步有能力吸引供应商,在良性循环中增加消费者需求优步副总裁兼UberEverything负责人Jason Droege,在接受采访时告诉Eater今年夏天:

I think that we’re all here to service the consumer, right? And the eater而且我认为今天的食客需要方便,他们想要价值,他们需要灵活性,他们想要选择交付提供所有这些东西餐厅选择参加送货因此,如果他们不相信它作为连接消费者或新消费者的渠道有价值,或者用他们的品牌吸引新的人,那就没关系我们在这里提供两者之间的渠道不要告诉他们如何经营他们的业务。

It certainly is an open question as to whether services like Uber Eats help or hurt established restaurants; this纽约客文章回顾一些关于餐馆老板的轶事,他们对Uber Eats花费多少钱有点模糊,就像优步司机忘记考虑他们的汽车磨损一样与此同时,优步正在为专注于交付的餐厅创造全新的机会,就像那些只想有时工作,或者根本找不到任何其他工作的司机一样,以及为他们提供服务的公司HyreCar

Moreover, Uber Eats has a leg-up in the space because of Uber itself: the latter can acquire customers from the former (both because of owned-and-operated advertising as well as reducing drop-off because Uber already has payment details), and all of those huge marketing and G&A expenses from building out teams in every city Uber operates is easily leveraged for Uber Eats这当然也适用于驾驶员购置成本。

然而,最大的收益来自于有效地为司机捆绑机会任何独立的餐厅送餐应用程序的问题是绝大多数订单来自午餐和晚餐,但司机可能希望在一天中的其他时间工作优步很容易:只需搭便车(优步司机可以开车去Uber,只有Uber Eats,或两者兼而有之)换句话说,优步拥有越来越多的方式来垄断司机的时间,个人驾驶员的利益以及优步的竞争优势。

优步的驱动程序包

为了确保一个GrubHub驱动程序,随机选择一个Uber Eats竞争对手,也可以为Lyft(或Uber,就此而言)开车,但那就是为一定数量的游乐设施奖励驾驶员在给定的时间段内特别有效:因为司机可以通过Uber乘车共享旅行或Uber Eats旅行来完成他们的“任务”,简单地坚持Uber通常更有意义。

更广泛地说,优步与司机面临的挑战来自于同样的可替代性,这使得服务首先成为可能为此,接近驱动程序市场的最佳方式不是与这个现实竞争,而是接受它,并且拥有使用相同驱动程序池的多个服务可以完全实现。

自动驾驶汽车:捆绑作为前进之路

与此同时,自动驾驶汽车仍然是优步的白鲸该公司收到了一份昨天丰田投资5亿美元,并将努力将其技术融入丰田Sienna小型货车。

这绝对不是单位的剥离信息说已被提出; the unit has apparently cost Uber $2 billion over the last two years当然,正如我上面提到的那样,与失去谷歌作为Lyft潜在合作伙伴的战略影响相比,这一成本相形见绌。

不过,考虑做正确的事情永远不会太晚:我继续相信优步对自动驾驶汽车的投资是一个战略错误Yes, its biggest cost is drivers, and a theoretical Google ride-sharing service could, were it at scale, completely undercut Uber, but that is the shallowest possible way to analyze how this market might have played out.

请记住我刚刚提到的关于司机的观点:确定将您最昂贵的供应输入(必须在边际基础上支付并且您无法控制)转换为您拥有的独家权利的固定成本,这听起来很有吸引力不过,这对于一家目前损失约10亿美元的企业来说意味着更多的资本支出25美分硬币更糟糕的是,它意味着在一个领域 - 机器学习 - 与谷歌竞争 - 这个搜索巨头拥有巨大的优势。

此外,从长远来看,谷歌似乎不太可能想要建立一个垂直的优步竞争对手:从财务角度和谷歌的历史利润率方面来看,它的技术许可仍然更合乎逻辑。可以肯定的是,如果Waymo的技术优越,它们将具有批发转让定价能力Tren Griffin描述道如:

向A公司提供独特产品XYZ的A公司的讨价还价能力,可以使A公司通过提高XYZ的批发价格来获取B公司的利润

不过就是这样的事情:Uber比其他任何人都更好地应对Waymo潜在的提取优势自驱动技术利润的能力毕竟,该公司已经为驱动技术付出了代价 - 技术恰好是人类!

当然,这并不意味着优步应该满足于支付Waymo而不是司机:乘车共享服务仍然是每个从事自动驾驶技术工作的人的最佳上市方式为此,优步应该愿意与任何人和每个人合作 - 并与任何想要它的人分享它的技术从长远来看,凭借其网络,优步拥有市场力量,并且它将最大程度地利用这种能力,以至于它可以在自动驾驶汽车领域引起供应商之间的竞争。

优步的自动驾驶捆绑

而且,每当自动驾驶汽车出现时,似乎可以肯定甚至Waymo也遇到了麻烦),它们不适合优步经营的所有环境这使得优步非常适合将自驾车服务与传统的优步汽车服务捆绑在一起,以及计划为消费者提供的所有其他运输服务这种“捆绑”将允许自动驾驶技术在有意义的时间和地点逐步推向市场,同时仍然让乘客有信心从任何地方到任何地方。

为了公平起见,Khosrowshahi表示希望与包括谷歌在内的多个自驾车合作伙伴合作但我怀疑,只要优步追求自己独有的技术,这将很难实现To that end Khosrowshahi should cut the cord with Uber’s self-driving program sooner rather than later, or perhaps even open-source it; the money savings are in fact the second most important potential benefit.


优步在卡兰尼克领导下的原始战略的残酷性有一定的令人满意的简单性:尽可能积极地建立早期领先优势,然后利用优步看似无限的筹集资金以使其竞争对手投入提交的能力但最终,卡兰尼克的同样残暴,以及他的战略。

这使得Khosrowshahi面临一个更为复杂的局面:他不仅需要在内部修复Uber,还需要创建一个全新的战略,以便在由于Uber危机而从根本上改变的市场中获胜为用户提供服务,为驾驶员提供机会,以及理想的自驾车技术,作为替代方案是有意义的。

不过,这种策略符合形势的本质,相当复杂,相应的成功机会 - 最终是盈利能力 - 相当低换句话说,优步的董事会戏剧可能已经结束,但该公司仍然可能是最引人注目的技术。

我写了一篇关于这篇文章的后续文章这个每日更新

  1. 优步自愿与媒体分享高水平的数据(“华尔街日报”收集了它们这里),但这些数字是选择性的,未经审计,并且没有财务文件[↩︎]
  2. The company now deducts the amount spent on driver incentives and promotions, in addition to driver earnings on a percentage basis, from its overall bookings; this is a very welcome improvement to the company’s reporting先前目前还不清楚这笔支出是否正确计算[↩︎]
  3. 您可以从2015年泄露的文档中看到旧的细分这里[↩︎]
  4. 正如之前的脚注中所述,优步似乎确实扣除了适用于预订的特定游乐设施的促销费用,因此这些都是非单位营销费用[↩︎]