欧盟与互联网

Earlier this summer the Internet breathed a sigh of relief: the European Parliament voted down a new Copyright Directive that would have required Internet sites to proactively filter uploaded content for copyright violations (the so-called “meme ban”), as well as obtain a license to include any text from linked sites (the “link tax”).

唉,胜利是短暂的从EUbusiness

根据欧盟议会批准的版权指令草案的修订,包括谷歌和Facebook在内的互联网技术巨头可以监控,过滤和阻止互联网上传在全体会议上,欧洲议会议员通过了委员会欧盟版权指令草案的修正案,其中包括以前的拒绝,增加了保护小企业和言论自由的保障措施......

议会的立场强化了委员会提出的使在线平台和集合商对侵犯版权负责的计划这也适用于片段,其中仅显示新闻发布者文本的一小部分在实践中,这种责任要求这些当事人向权利持有人支付他们提供的受版权保护的材料。

同时,为了鼓励初创企业和创新,该文本现在免除了小型和微型平台的指令。

我之所以选择这个相当模糊的来源是有原因的:如果Stratechery有超过50名员工或1000万欧元的收入,根据这项法规,我可能需要补偿欧盟业务的摘录Fortunately (well, unfortunately!), this won’t be the case anytime soon; I appreciate the European Parliament giving me a chance to start-up and innovate.

此异常,以及删除显式调用过滤(在实践中仍然需要),足以让版权指令通过This doesn’t mean it is law: the final form of the Directive needs to be negotiated by the EU Parliament, European Commission, and the Council of the Europe Union (which represents national governments), and then implemented via national laws in each EU country (that’s why it is a指示)。

尽管如此,这并不是欧盟政策制定者尚未掌握互联网性质的唯一证据:还有通用数据保护条例(GDPR),该条例于今年年初生效与版权指令非常相似,GDPR针对的是谷歌和Facebook,但是当你从根本上误解你的战斗时总是如此,其实的净效果实际上是加强他们的护城河毕竟,谁比其他大公司更能应对复杂的监管,谁比那些收集最多的公司需要更少的外部数据呢?

In fact, examining where it is that the EU’s new Copyright Directive goes wrong — not just in terms of policy, but also for the industries it seeks to protect — hints at a new way to regulate, one that works with the fundamental forces unleashed by the Internet, instead of against them.

第13条和版权

原谅(字面)法律术语,但这是版权指令的相关部分(原始指令是这里而上周通过的评论是这里)与互联网平台的版权责任有关:

在线内容共享服务提供商执行向公众传播的行为,因此对其内容负责,因此应与权利人签订公平合理的许可协议在签订许可协议的情况下,它们还应在相同的程度和范围内涵盖用户以非商业身份行事时的责任......

Member States should provide that where right holders do not wish to conclude licensing agreements, online content sharing service providers and right holders should cooperate in good faith in order to ensure that unauthorised protected works or other subject matter, are not available on their services在线内容服务提供商与权利人之间的合作不应导致阻止非侵权作品或其他受保护主题的可用性,包括版权例外或限制所涵盖的内容......

This is legislative fantasizing at its finest: Internet platforms should get a license from all copyright holders, but if they don’t want to (or, more realistically, are unable to), then they should keep all copyrighted material off of their platforms, even as they allow all non-infringing work and exceptionsThis last bit is a direct response to the “meme ban” framing: memes are OK, but the exception “should only be applied in certain special cases which do not conflict with normal exploitation of the work or other subject-matter concerned and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the rightholder.”1That’s nearly impossible for a human to parse; expecting a scalable solution — which yes, inevitably means content filtering — is absurd在没有大量错误的情况下,没有办法,特别是在规模上,先发制人地消除侵犯版权的行为。

那么,问题是这些错误应该朝哪个方向发展通过回想起来,通过什么幸运的历史事故2互联网公司大多不受责任限制,只需在合理的时间内回复删除通知换句话说,系统偏向于否定否定:如果出现错误,那就是不应上传的内容是然而,版权指令会将偏见转向误报:它会犯错误,因为担心责任会阻止允许的内容。

这是个错误首先,版权的概念是政府授予对特定词语排列的垄断我当然不反对这一点 - 我显然是一个恩人 - 但在一个自由社会中,怀疑的利益应该与那些拥有剥夺自由的合法权利的人相反。另一方面,版权指令要求互联网平台作为政府垄断的事实上的执行机制,唯一合乎逻辑的反应是走得太远。

此外,版权所有者侵犯版权的成本实际上已大幅下降Here I am referring to cost in a literal sense: to “steal” a copyrighted work in the analog age required the production of a physical product with its associated marginal costs; anyone that paid that cost was spending real money that was not going to the copyright holderDigital goods, on the other hand, cost nothing to copy; pirated songs or movies or yes,战略每日更新,对于版权所有者来说,收益最低的指标是非常微弱的换句话说,伤害是真实的,但伤害的程度是不可知的,介于版权所有者声称的天文数量和工作本身的零边际成本之间。

更大的挑战是整个版权制度都以这些物理媒介为基础:实物商品更容易追踪,更容易禁止,而且批判性更容易定价通过扩展,任何针对此问题的监管 - 或商业模式 - 以在互联网时代之前引导版权的相同假设开始,今天根本没有意义建立基于互联网的新商业模式更有意义。

音乐产业就是一个很好的例子:RIAA仍在抱怨因盗版造成数十亿美元的损失但很多人都没有意识到这个行业恢复增长,包括去年16.5%的收入增长The driver is streaming, which — just look at the name! — depends on the Internet: subscribers get access to basically all of the songs they could ever want, while the recording industry earns somewhere around $65 per individual subscriber per year with no marginal costs.3It’s a fantastic value for customers and an equally fantastic revenue model for recording companies; that alignment stems from swimming with the Internet, not against it.

This, you’ll note, is not a statement that copyright is inherently bad, but rather an argument that copyright regulation and business models predicated on scarcity are unworkable and ultimately unprofitable; what makes far more sense for everyone from customers to creators is an approach that presumes abundance监管应采用类似的观点:将版权所有者的负担不仅放在监管他们的工作上,而且还要创新实际上与世界一致的商业模式,而不是现实。

第11条和集合者

这种从稀缺到丰富的转变也对出版物的价值链产生了深远的影响,我已经描述过了聚合理论(“价值已从控制稀缺资源分配的公司转移到控制稀缺资源需求的公司“)Unfortunately the authors of the Copyright Directive are quite explicit in their lack of understanding of this dynamic; from Article 11 of the Directive:

强大的平台和新闻出版商(也可能是新闻机构)之间日益加剧的不平衡已导致媒体格局在区域层面上显着退步在从印刷到数字的过渡中,新闻出版物的出版商和新闻机构在许可其出版物的在线使用和收回其投资方面面临着问题。在没有承认新闻出版物的出版商作为权利人的情况下,数字环境中的许可和执行通常是复杂和低效的。

In this reading the problem facing publishers is a bureaucratic one: capturing what is rightfully theirs is “complex and inefficient”, so the Directive provides for “the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit direct or indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, in whole or in part” of their publications “so that they may obtain fair and proportionate remuneration for the digital use of their press publications by information society service providers.”4

The problem, though, is that the issue facing publishers is not a problem of bureaucracy but of their relative position in a world characterized by abundance我写的富足时代的经济权力

对于典型的报纸而言,竞争环境与他们习以为常的完全相反:不是有大量的出版材料,而是有丰富的资源。更重要的是,竞争环境的这种转变从根本上改变了谁拥有经济实力。

在由稀缺性定义的世界中,控制稀缺资源的人有权设定获取这些资源的价格In the case of newspapers, the scarce resource was reader’s attention, and the purchasers were advertisers…The Internet, though, is a world of abundance, and there is a new power that matters: the ability to make sense of that abundance, to index it, to find needles in the proverbial haystack这种力量由谷歌掌握因此,虽然广告客户渴望的观众现在无可救药地在有限数量的出版商中分散,但他们寻求必要的读者从同一个地方开始 - 谷歌 - 因此,这就是广告资金已经消失的地方。

这是我用来显示出版特别转变的插图(这次使用Facebook):

聚合理论图 -  Facebook和报纸

This is why the so-called “link tax” is doomed to failure — indeed, it has already failed every time it has been attempted谷歌,谷歌新闻没有直接收入,将停止向欧盟提供谷歌新闻,或大幅削减其显示的内容,除了欧盟消费者之外,唯一受到伤害的实体是从谷歌新闻获取流量的出版物再说一遍到底发生了什么

还有另一种方法可以理解这个提案在多大程度上是针对自然市场力量的裸体尝试:谷歌的搜索引擎尊重一个网站的robot.txt的文件,其中发布者可以从公司的索引中排除他们的网站如果谷歌真的从出版商的硬言论中获利不公平,那么出版商就有了一个易于获取的工具来让他们停下来And yet they don’t, because the reality is that while publishers need Google (and Facebook), that need is not reciprocated为此,描述可能从谷歌和Facebook(或1000万美元的创收战略)流向出版商的资金的唯一方式是作为再分配税,由持有枪支的人强制执行。

在这里,解决方案应该以相反的方向流动,以利用互联网的方式,而不是与之抗争An increasing number of publishers, from large newspapers to sites like Stratechery, are taking advantage of the massive addressable market unlocked by the Internet, leveraging the marketing possibilities of free social media and search engine results, and connecting directly with readers that care — and charging them for it.

我确实认识到这是一个需要时间的过程:对于建立垄断假设的出版商来说,改变其商业模式不仅仅是他们的商业模式特别困难。整个编辑策略对于一个质量比数量更重要的世界为此,如果欧盟希望,正如他们在版权指令中所说的那样,“保证可靠信息的可用性”,那么制定他们有效提出的税收和补贴计划是明确的至少那时每个人都清楚发生了什么。

GDPR和聚合的监管推论

这让我了解了一条立法非常批评很长一段时间:GDPR立法的目的当然是令人钦佩的 - 保护消费者隐私 - 尽管这可能是我说的美国人。我或许对大多数消费者在媒体中对精英的关心程度持怀疑态度无论如何,意图比影响更重要,后者是巩固谷歌和Facebook我写的开放,封闭和隐私

While GDPR advocates have pointed to the lobbying Google and Facebook have done against the law as evidence that it will be effective, that is to completely miss the point: of course neither company wants to incur the costs entailed in such significant regulation, which will absolutely restrict the amount of information they can collect遗漏的是,数字广告的增长是一个长期趋势,首先是眼球:在手机上花费的时间越来越多,广告收入将不可避免地随之而来The calculation that matters, then, is not how much Google or Facebook are hurt in isolation, but how much they are hurt relatively to their competitors, and the obvious answer is “a lot less”, which, in the context of that secular increase, means growth.

This is the conundrum that faces all major Internet regulation, including the Copyright Directive; after all, Google and Facebook can afford — or have already built — content filtering systems, and they already have users’ attention such that they can afford to cut off content suppliers为此,问题不在于什么样的监管是必要的,更多的是关于什么监管甚至是可能的(当然,假设谷歌和Facebook的目标不是目标)。

这是考虑版权指令问题的有用之处:

  • 首先,正如应该构建利用互联网而不是对抗互联网的商业模式一样,监管也应如此。
  • 其次,监管应首先要了解互联网上的电力来自控制需求而非供应。

要了解这种规则可能是什么样子,向后工作可能会有所帮助具体来说,在过去六个月中,Facebook在保护用户隐私方面取得了巨大进步该公司已关闭对敏感数据的第三方访问,对访问该数据的应用程序开发人员进行了多次审核,添加了新的隐私控制等此外,该公司已经做到了这一点所有其用户,而不仅仅是欧盟的用户,表明其行动不是由GDPR推动的。

事实上,原因很明显:剑桥分析公司的丑闻,以及与之相关的所有负面关注换句话说,糟糕的公关在用户隐私方面推动了更多的Facebook行动,而不是GDPR或者FTC同意法令This shouldn’t be a surprise; I wrote inFacebook的动机

也许还有第三个动机:称之为“开明的自我利益。”请记住Facebook的权力流动:控制需求Facebook是一个超级聚合, which means it leverages its direct relationship with users, zero marginal costs to serve those users, and network effects, to steadily decrease acquisition costs and scale infinitely in a virtuous cycle that gives the company power over both supply (publishers) and advertisers.

因此,Facebook的终极威胁永远不会来自出版商或广告商,而是需求 - 即用户The real danger, though, is not from users also using competing social networks (although Facebook has always been paranoid about exactly that); that is not enough to break the virtuous cycle相反,唯一能够取消Facebook权力的是用户主动拒绝该应用程序并且,我怀疑,用户会这样做的唯一方式是,如果Facebook成为公认的事实,Facebook对你有积极的影响 - 在线等同于吸烟。

对于Facebook来说,剑桥分析公司的丑闻与此类似外科医生将关于吸烟的报告:威胁不是监管机构会采取行动,而是用户会这样做,而且没有什么可能更致命那是因为:

聚合理论的监管推论是,最终的监管形式是用户生成的

If regulators, EU or otherwise, truly want to constrain Facebook and Google — or, for that matter, all of the other ad networks and companies that in reality are far more of a threat to user privacy — then the ultimate force is user demand, and the lever is demanding transparency on exactly what these companies are doing.

为此,我是一个关注用户隐私的监管机构,我的出发点不是执行机制,而是透明机制I would establish clear metrics to measure user privacy — types of data retained, types of data inferred, mechanisms to delete user-generated data, mechanisms to delete inferred data, what data is shared, and with whom — and then measure the companies under my purview — with subpoena power if necessary — and publish the results for the users to see.

This is the way to truly bring the market to bear on these giants: not regulatory fiat, but user sentiment这是因为它是一种理解世界的方法,而不是它本身,并且欣赏不良公关 - 因为它影响需求 - 是一种更有效的变革煽动者,而不是垄断利润带来的罚款。

我写了一篇关于这篇文章的后续文章这个每日更新

  1. “模因异常”的全文:

    Despite some overlap with existing exceptions or limitations, such as the ones for quotation and parody, not all content that is uploaded or made available by a user that reasonably includes extracts of protected works or other subject-matter is covered by Article 5 of Directive 2001/29/EC这种情况会给用户和权利人带来法律上的不确定性因此,有必要提供一个新的特定例外,以允许在用户上传或提供的内容中合法使用预先存在的受保护作品或其他主题的摘录。如果用户生成或提供的内容涉及为合法目的短期和按比例使用报价或受保护作品或其他主题的摘录,则此类使用应受本指令规定的例外保护。该例外仅适用于某些特殊情况,这些特殊情况与正常利用的工作或其他相关主题不相冲突,并且不会无理损害权利人的合法利益。For the purpose of assessing such prejudice, it is essential that the degree of originality of the content concerned, the length/extent of the quotation or extract used, the professional nature of the content concerned or the degree of economic harm be examined, where relevant, while not precluding the legitimate enjoyment of the exception此例外不应影响作者或其他主题的作者的精神权利。[↩︎]

  2. 这个链接是关于第230条,这是一个美国法律保护互联网平台免受其用户上传的责任,但广义上讲同样的原则适用于E.U.目前[↩︎]
  3. That $65 figure is an estimate of the amount paid out by streaming services like Spotify; the total number per listener is lower, thanks to family plans and shared accounts [↩︎]
  4. 第一个报价来自欧盟指令2001/29 / EC这是在新的版权指令中明确引起的,从第二次引用开始[↩︎]
  5. 当然,该公司会收集用于其他地方广告的数据[↩︎]