我后悔推特略,不仅因为“钟鸣在188足球比分直播网”总是有风险的回到Stratechery开始的时候我写了第一个帖子that one of the topics I looked forward to exploring was “Why Wall Street is not completely insane”; I was thinking at the time about Apple, a company that, especially at that time, was regularly posting eye-popping revenue and profit numbers that did not necessarily lead to corresponding increases in the stock price, much to the consternation of Apple shareholdersThe underlying point should be an obvious one: a stock price is about future earnings, not already realized ones; that the iPhone maker had just had a great quarter was an important signal about the future, but not a determinant factor, and that those pointing to the past to complain about a price predicated on the future were missing the point.
但值得注意的是，虽然这些苹果股东的明确推理可能是可疑的，但他们的情绪已被证明是正确的：2013年4月Apple报道quarterly revenue of $43.6 billion and profit of $9.5 billion, and the day I started Stratechery the stock price was $63.25; five years laterApple报道季度收入为611亿美元，利润为138亿美元，周五股价为190.98美元。
The question is if a similar case can be made for Facebook: certainly my tweet taken literally was naive for the exact reasons those Apple investor complaints missed the point five years ago; what about the sentiment, though? Just how good of a business is Facebook?
与收益通常就是这样,在Facebook的股票只有一下结果,很多对未来的期望On Wednesday, Facebook’s stock closed at $217, but then its earnings showed revenue of $13.2 billion, slightly below Wall Street’s expectations; unsurprisingly, the stock slid about 8% in after-hours trading to around $200两条评论激发了真正的下跌在收益电话会议上来自Facebook首席财务官Dave Wehner关于Facebook未来的期望。
Turning now to the revenue outlook; our total revenue growth rate decelerated approximately 7 percentage points in Q2 compared to Q1我们的总收入增长率将在2018年下半年继续减速，我们预计第三季度和第四季度的收入增长率将比前几个季度的高个位数下降。
Turning now to expenses; we continue to expect that full-year 2018 total expenses will grow in the range of 50% to 60% compared to last year…Looking beyond 2018, we anticipate that total expense growth will exceed revenue growth in 2019在接下来的几年中，我们预计我们的营业利润率将以百分比的形式趋向30年代中期。
From a purely financial perspective, both pieces of news are are less than ideal but at least understandableIn terms of revenue, Facebook’s growth is from a very large base, which means that this quarter’s 42% year-over-year revenue growth to $13.2 billion from $9.3 billion is, in absolute terms, 36% greater than the year ago’s 45% revenue growth (from $6.4 billion)To put it in simpler terms, massive growth rates inevitably decline even as massive absolute growth remains; as a point of comparison, Google in the same relative timeframe (14 years after incorporation) grew 35 percent to $12.21 billion (i.eFacebook是更好的在两个指标)。
营业利润率下降,在一个正常的公司——即一个边际成本 - 收入减少不一定会导致保证金有意义的下降，因为减少产品销售意味着降低销售成本Facebook,当然,不是一个正常的公司:唯一的边际成本的广告销售信用卡费用;像大多数科技公司一样the vast majority of costs are “below the line” (mostly in Research & Development, but also Sales & Marketing and General & Administrative); it follows, then, that a decrease in revenue growth would, absent an explicit effort to decrease unrelated (to revenue) expense growth, lead to lower operating margins.
In fact, Facebook is not only not decreasing expenses, they are going in the opposite direction; expenses are growing faster than ever, even as revenue growth clearly fell off:
I suspect it is this chart, more than anything else, that explains the drop in Facebook’s stock price: it’s not one thing or the other; it is both revenue growth slowing and expenses accelerating at the same time, with all indications from management are that the trends will continue.
Again, relatively speaking Facebook is in great shape financially — I already noted the company had better revenue and growth numbers than Google at a similar point, and their operating margins are substantially better as well — but there’s no question this is a pretty substantial shift in the company’s longterm outlook金融镜头仍然提供了一个非常积极的看法,但它确实是比以前更积极。
关于Facebook的写作总是有点混乱，因为Facebook公司和Facebook都是产品，毫无疑问，多年来，最大量的消极性一直围绕着后者。To that end, it is tempting to conflate the two; for example, the New York Times wrote in an article headlinedFacebook开始为丑闻付出代价:
This is true as far as it goes, particular when it comes to expenses: Facebook is on pace to increase its security and content review teams to 20,000 people, a three-fold increase in 18 months; that is why CEO Mark Zuckerberg警告称,在去年的财报电话会议:
A year ago, though, Facebook stopped increasing ad load; as我有记录这确实导致每个广告支付的价格更加急剧增加，但它仍然是增长的阻碍因素。
然后，在过去一年中，Facebook的用户增长开始放缓，并且在利润最高的北美地区，已经有效稳定That, though, isn’t because of Facebook’s controversies: it is because the app has run out of people! The company has 241 million monthly active users in the US & Canada, 65% of the total population of 372 million (including children who aren’t supposed to have accounts before the age of 13).
考虑到几乎完全渗透的程度，在评估Facebook的健康状况时更重要的是没有迹象表明该公司正在失去用户Sure, the numbers in North America decreased by a million in Q4 2017, but now that million is back; I expect something similar when it comes to the million users the company lost in Europe when it required affirmative consent from users to continue using the app because of GDPR.
The fact of the matter is that nothing has happened to diminish Facebook’s moat when it comes to attracting and retaining users: the number one feature of a social network is how many people are on it, and for all intents and purposes everyone is on Facebook — whether they like it or not.
扎克伯格指的是他2017年的宣言建立一个全球社区; it is a particularly attractive goal from Facebook’s perspective because it makes the product stickier than ever.
所有这一切，通过该公司产品的镜头观看Facebook的最重要原因是Facebook的应用程序的庞大规模使得很容易失去其他产品的仍然可观的增长潜力的网站特别是Instagram最近通过了10亿用户, which is an incredible number that is still less than half of Facebook the app’s total users; by definition Instagram has reached less than half of its addressable market.
此外，Instagram不仅没有被Facebook的争议所触及，它是如此引人注目的产品，有趣地说，大多数“Facebook-nevers”或“Facebook-quitters”乐意承认每天使用该服务该应用程序还没有达到其货币化潜力：虽然Feed具有与Facebook相同的广告负载，但是SnapChat-inspired故事格式that has exploded in usage has barely been monetized; in fact, Facebook’s executives attributed some of the company’s slowing revenue growth to increased Stories usage (instead of the feed)从纯粹的金融的角度来看这是一个引起人们的关注,但从战略角度来看,这意味着Instagram以前在一个更有利的位置记住,收入和利润是滞后指标,Instagram的故事是一个极端的例子的爆炸原因是要牢记这样一个重要的事实。
This lens takes the exact opposite perspective of Lens 2; looking at the company from a product perspective shows four different apps, but looking at the company from an advertising perspective shows a single integrated machine.
In terms of Facebook versus Instagram, they’re obviously both contributing to revenue growthInstagram正在快速增长，并为增长做出越来越大的贡献我们一直满意Instagram如何增长。Facebook和Instagram实际上是一个广告生态系统。
但最大的影响是潜在的竞争很有可能专注于“投资回报率”中的“R” - 投资回报 - 正如我刚才注意到的Instagram + Facebook使其更具吸引力Just as important, though, is the “I”; there is tremendous benefit to being a one-stop shop for advertisers, who can save time and money by focusing their spend on Facebook这些工具很熟悉，购买是跨平台进行的，正如扎克伯格和桑德伯格提到的关于Stories一样，广告本身只需要制作一次就可以在多个平台上使用Why even go to the trouble to advertise anywhere else?
这就是为什么广告镜头时可能是最有用的理解是多么的Facebook的业务仍然强劲,特别是为什么Instagram收购是一个大问题所有的讨论Facebook应用程序的锁定,非常合理的怀疑订婚是降低随着时间的推移,特别是在年轻人中间,或者争议可能会降低使用-或者更糟Were Instagram a separate company, advertisers might find themselves with no choice but to spread out their advertising to multiple companies, and once their advertising was diversified, it would be a much smaller step to target users on other networks like SnapChat or 188足球比分直播网无论Facebook的应用程序发生什么，现在都没有理由让Facebook成为广告平台。
The first is GDPR; this may seem counter-intuitive, given that Facebook said last week the regulation cost them a million users, and that one of the factors that would hurt revenue growth was the increased controls the company was giving users when it comes to controlling their personal information但请记住，GDPR适用于所有人，而不仅仅是Facebook，正如Sandberg在电话会议上所说的那样（我特别强调):
广告商仍在适应变化，因此现在知道长期影响还为时过早And things like GDPR and other privacy changes that may happen from us or may happen with regulation could make ads more relevant我们知道不会改变的一件事是，广告商总是在寻找最高的投资回报率机会和赢得预算最重要的是我们在行业中的相对表现,我们相信我们会继续做得很好。
While GDPR advocates have pointed to the lobbying Google and Facebook have done against the law as evidence that it will be effective, that is to completely miss the point: of course neither company wants to incur the costs entailed in such significant regulation, which will absolutely restrict the amount of information they can collect遗漏的是，数字广告的增长是一个长期趋势，首先是眼球：在手机上花费的时间越来越多，广告收入将不可避免地随之而来The calculation that matters, then, is not how much Google or Facebook are hurt in isolation, but how much they are hurt relatively to their competitors, and the obvious answer is “a lot less”, which, in the context of that secular increase, means growth.
Secondly, all of those costs that Facebook are incurring for security and content review that are reducing operating margin? Perhaps the stock market would feel better if they were characterized as moat expansion, because that’s exactly what they are: any would-be Facebook competitor is going to have to make a similar investment, and do it from a dramatically lower revenue base.
More broadly, our strategy is to use Facebook’s computing infrastructure, business platforms and security systems to serve people across all of our apps…We’re using AI systems in our global community operations team to fight spam, harassment, hate speech, and terrorism across all of our apps to keep people safe这对于像WhatsApp和Instagram这样的应用来说非常有用，因为它可以帮助我们更有效地应对超高速增长的挑战。
This is why the lens with which you view Facebook matters so much: the exact same set of facts viewed from a financial perspective are a clear negative; from a moat perspective they are a clear positive.
我很喜欢说很少有公司像Facebook一样被低估，特别是在硅谷Admittedly, it seems strange to say such a thing about a $245 billion company with a trailing 12-month P/E ratio of 88, but that is Wall Street sentiment; in the tech bubble many seem to simply assume the company is ever on the brink of teetering “just like MySpace”, never mind the fact that the social network pioneer barely broke 100 million registered users, less than 10% of the number of active users Facebook attracted in a single day late last month或者，正如更清醒的头脑可能会争辩的那样，Facebook今天看起来势不可挡，但十年前谷歌看起来势不可挡，当时社交似乎无处不在：肯定Facebook杀手迫在眉睫！
事实上,它存在它存在的原因:Facebook在扎克伯格的哈佛宿舍开始数字化线下关系已经存在,在现实生活和实际物理“书面”Facebook是如此强大，因为它与现实世界的直接联系：它是浅薄的，有点恶意，有时是恶意的 - 是的，往往是好的 - 因为我们人类是浅薄的，有点恶意，有时是恶意的 - 是的，往往是好的。
By extension, to insist that Facebook will die any day now is in some respects to suggest that humanity will cease to exist any day now; granted, it is a company and companies fail, but even if Facebook failed it would only be a matter of time before another Facebook rose to replace it.
That seems unlikely: for all of the company’s travails and controversies over the past few years, its moats are deeper than ever, its money-making potential not only huge but growing both internally and secularly; to that end, what is perhaps most distressing of all to would-be competitors is in fact this quarter’s results: at the end of the day Facebook took a massive hit通过选择; the company is not maximizing the short-term, it is spending the money and suppressing its revenue potential in favor of becoming more impenetrable than ever.