亚马逊的税收

昨天十年前亚马逊传道者杰夫巴尔张贴一篇222字的文章Amazon Web Services的博客1打开:

今天早些时候,我们推出了Amazon S3,可靠,高度可伸缩的、低延迟的数据存储服务。

Until then Amazon Web Services had primarily been about providing developers with a way to tap into the Amazon retail store; S3, though, had nothing at all to do with retail,2至少不是直接。

AWS的起源

布拉德·斯通详细所有的商店,在2000年代早期亚马逊越来越受到各个团队在公司都是由一个庞大的技术团队,为每个项目授权和自旋向上的资源石头写道:

同时,贝佐斯成为迷恋一本叫做创造,史蒂夫·大,开发人员被称为生物的1990年代的电子游戏允许玩家指导和培养一个看似聪明的生物在他们的电脑屏幕上大写道,他的方法创建智能生命是专注于设计简单的计算构建块,称为原语,然后坐下来,看着令人惊讶的行为出现。

这本书…帮助结晶的争论的问题与公司的基础设施If Amazon wanted to stimulate creativity among its developers, it shouldn’t try to guess what kind of services they might want; such guesses would be based on patterns of the past相反,它应该创建原语——计算的基石——然后走出换句话说,它需要将其基础设施分解为最小的,最简单的原子组件和自由允许开发人员访问尽可能多的灵活性。

“原语”模式模块化亚马逊的基础设施,有效地将原始数据中心组件转换为存储、计算、数据库等可用于临时不仅由亚马逊的内部团队,而且外部开发者:

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这个AWS层中间有几个主要特征:

  • AWS巨大的固定成本但非常从规模经济中受益
  • 构建AWS的成本是合理的,因为第一次和最好的客户是亚马逊的电子商务业务
  • AWS的重点是“原语”意味着它可以按原样出售给开发商除了亚马逊,增加收益成比例,通过扩展、深化AWS的护城河

This last point was a win-win: developers would have access to enterprise-level computing resources with zero up-front investment; Amazon, meanwhile, would get that much more scale for a set of products for which they would be the first and best customer.

AWS的税收

AWS成功地说,它的使命是野生轻描淡写:对开发商的影响正是AWS负责人安迪雅西在他的愿景声明中写道石头这么总结:

本文提出了扩大AWS的使命:“让开发者和企业使用Web服务来构建复杂的和可伸缩的应用程序”……

“我们试图想象一个学生能在一个宿舍里谁会在他或她的处理相同的基础设施作为世界上最大的公司,”雅西说“我们认为这是一个伟大的:矫直机对创业公司和小公司和大公司一样的成本结构。”

,几乎每一个创业的注意是建立在过去几年中已经开始在AWS或它的一个竞争对手AWS的真实测量的影响,是它改变了生态系统的开发人员,包括风险资本

亚马逊已经受到的影响同样重要:我详细的去年AWS的启示是如何的财务结果有效Facebook-level IPO,和随后的财报AWS表明规模的力量——增加收入+增加利润率只有凝固AWS的事实将会大幅推动亚马逊的收入和利润(最终)很长一段时间来吗社会+资本创始人Chamath Palihapitiya,当被问及他将投资公司只能选择一个,在Quora回应:

AWS是经济计算征税So whether you care about mobile apps, consumer apps, IoT, SaaS etc, more companies than not will be using AWS vs building their own infrastructure电子商务下dogfood AWS是amazon的方法,和继续这样做,这是任务等级If you believe that over time the software industry is a multi, deca-trillion industry, then ask yourself how valuable a company would be who taxes the majority of that industry? 1%, 2%, 5% — it doesn’t matter because the numbers are so huge — the revenues, profits, profit margins etc我没有看到任何清洁垄断现在可用在公开市场购买。

垄断Palihapitiya指的是基于我上面提到的规模效应:更大的AWS,亚马逊拥有更大的优势在定价AWS服务,这意味着他们可以挣到更多的业务,从而增加他们的优势更多最终的结果是,除了最大的云计算公司3.this advantage, combined with the flexibility AWS affords (which is critical both operationally and financially), will lead to the inevitable conclusion that Amazon ought to service all their infrastructure needs; the payments they make for this service are Palihapitiya’s “tax”.

然而,什么是值得考虑的是,正如AWS的影响开发人员分散到更广泛的创业生态系统,看上去越发AWS的影响在亚马逊本身已经远远超出其重大贡献的底线吗亚马逊可能已经开始,使用石头的标题,“所有的商店,”但其未来是税吏一大堆从规模经济中受益的行业,和AWS是模型。

亚马逊的电子商务业务的变换

老读者会记得我经过我的亚马逊熊阶段4早在2014年;这是AWS让我放弃但即使我否认自己,我认为我的悲观分析关于亚马逊的电子商务业务被声音:

  • 亚马逊的“媒体”业务的书籍、cd、dvd、和视频游戏提供了绝大多数的“利润”,但这业务萎缩亚马逊的总销售额的比例,鉴于媒体长期趋势,绝对的基础上可能会继续缩小
  • “电子产品和一般商品”5快速增长,但商品销售的本质意味着有相对较少的保证金吗

What, though, if Amazon is content with making no margin on the sale of “Electronics and General Merchandise”? I don’t mean this in the马修Yglesias感, that Amazon “is a charitable organization being run by elements of the investment community for the benefit of consumers”; rather, what if the business model of Amazon’s e-commerce business has changed to “tax” collection?

Consider Costco: last year the wholesale retailer had net income of $2.3 billion on sales of $114 billion to its over 81 million members; the total sum of membership fees was $2.5 billionIn other words, Costco’s 11% gross margin didn’t even quite cover the cost of running the business; the difference, along with all of the profit, came from a “tax” levied on Costco customers.

我认为亚马逊的主要成员扮演相同的角色:non-AWS部分业务去年创造了26亿美元的营业利润;6meanwhile, Consumer Intelligent Research Partners (CIRP) estimates that Amazon now has 54 million Prime members, which at $99/member would generate $5.3 billion in revenue; the difference in profitability for Amazon’s e-commerce business, such as it is, comes from a “tax” levied on Amazon’s best customers.

不过事实上,我甚至认为这种分析太窄:电子商务无情地接管越来越多的美国尤其是零售业,和亚马逊在50%以上电子商务的发展结合这一现实的增长'和亚马逊实际上是在对收集所有的零售税。

再次,与AWS,这个税是消费者欣然接受:'是一个超级的经验,优越的价格,优越的选择,这也引发规模这样的结果是一个业务:

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当然,AWS一样的结构,它的股票类似的特点:

  • 电子商务分布有大量固定成本但非常从规模经济中受益
  • 建设亚马逊的实现成本中心是合理的,因为第一次和最好的客户是亚马逊的电子商务业务
  • That last bullet point may seem odd, but in fact 40% of Amazon’s sales (on a unit basis) are sold by 3rd-party merchants; most of these merchants leverage Fulfilled-by-Amazon, which means their goods are stored in Amazon’s fulfillment centers and covered by Prime这对亚马逊的规模报酬增加了实现中心,增加黄金的价值,加深亚马逊的护城河

The “tax” analogy extends beyond Prime; for example, Amazon is taking a portion of these 3rd-party sales, and a greater portion of revenue from goods they sell directly不过,效果是一致的:亚马逊是收集“税”一个庞大的产业,没有人的思想,因为亚马逊的规模保证最好的价格和最好的经验。

物流和回声

似乎越来越清楚的是,亚马逊打算重复模型在物流:去年试行六个飞机该公司最近租赁20多to flesh out its private logistics network; this is on top of注册其中国子公司作为一个海洋货运代理不足为奇,正如《华尔街日报》指出:

证券备案文件中,亚马逊首次发现“公司提供满足和物流服务为自己或为第三方,是否在线或离线”竞争And it referred to itself as a “transportation service provider.” In both cases, it marked the first time Amazon included such language in its annual report, known as a 10-K.

所以会如何上演?

从亚马逊这一事实本身就是物流网络的第一个也是最好的客户,就像与AWS的情况这证明了大规模支出需要构建一个物流网络与UPS,联邦快递,,大多数媒体框架这些举措作为亚马逊的方式控制运输成本,提高可靠性,特别是在假日的时候。

然而,我认为这是错误的认为,亚马逊将停止:就像他们与AWS和电子商务分销我希望公司提供第三方的物流网络,这将增加收益成比例,而且,通过扩展、深化亚马逊的最终的护城河。7

much-buzzed对回波fits this model too: all of the usual suspects can build out the various pieces of the connected home; Amazon will simply provide the linchpin, the Echo’s cost a “tax” on the connected home.

一个原始的组织

贝佐斯”1997年著名的股东信表明该模型的根从一开始就存在具体来说,贝佐斯非常专注于规模的力量:

我们的市场领导地位越强,更强大的经济模型市场领导可以直接翻译到更高的收入,提高盈利能力,更大的资本的速度,和相应的更强的投资资本回报率…我们选择优先增长,因为我们相信,规模是实现核心我们的商业模式的潜力。

It’s equally clear, though, that Bezos didn’t then fully appreciate that his model would extend far beyond e-commerce; that, though, is why Amazon’s internal organization is such a strengthThe company is organized with multiple relatively independent teams, each with their own P&L, accountabilities, and distributed decision-making石头解释早期贝佐斯计划(我特别强调):

The entire company, he said, would restructure itself around what he called “two-pizza teams.” Employees would be organized into autonomous groups of fewer than ten people — small enough that, when working late, the team members could be fed with two pizza pies这些团队将独立释放在亚马逊最大的问题……贝佐斯是一种混沌理论应用于管理,承认他的组织的复杂性把它分解到最基本的部分希望令人惊讶的结果可能会出现。

石头后来写道,双比萨团队没有最终意义无处不在,但他指出后续的一篇文章该公司仍然非常广泛分布的平面与责任在那里,在那些“最基本的”,是借自己的原语规模和实验记住上面的引用描述贝佐斯和团队抵达AWS的想法:

If Amazon wanted to stimulate creativity among its developers, it shouldn’t try to guess what kind of services they might want; such guesses would be based on patterns of the past相反,它应该创建原语——计算的基石——然后走出。

Steven Sinofsky喜欢指出组织倾向于船组织结构图,当我开始显示亚马逊复制AWS模式,事实证明,AWS模型在许多方面的表示亚马逊本身(就像iPhone在许多方面反映了苹果的单一组织):创建一个堆原语,让开,一个好的脱脂。

  1. 托管在Typepad(↩︎]
  2. 与流行的神话相反,亚马逊并不出售过剩的产能(↩︎]
  3. 我将讨论Dropbox最近宣布,他们远离AWS在明天的每日更新(↩︎]
  4. 就像青春期的科技分析师(↩︎]
  5. 这个术语来自亚马逊的财务报告(↩︎]
  6. 这不是相当于净收入的Costco号码(↩︎]
  7. 可以肯定的是,UPS,联邦快递,have a big head start, but their networks and cost structures are focused on businesses; Amazon will focus on consumers [↩︎]