谷歌和战略的局限

约翰·格鲁伯没有留下深刻印象这样的说法,谷歌的新像素手机,该公司在引入的主题昨天,是该公司第一次与iPhone竞争:

自首款Android手机问世以来,谷歌一直在与iPhone进行正面交锋你不能说Nexus手机不要数只是因为他们从来没有成功。

谷歌当时的工程副总裁Vic Gundotra把他2010 I / O主旨撷取到iPhone和iPad,油门踏板“开放节奏封闭”和超过60个不同的生态系统,Android设备(池塘与今天相比下降)是胜利,拯救世界的未来,“一个人,一个公司,一个装置”控制移动(Gundotra tossed in “one carrier”, which was true at the time, but looks foolish in hindsight.) He even compared the iPhone to Orwell’s 1984真的。

唯一的奥威尔式的记忆这是谷歌试图冲下去的洞他们先前试图去对比iPhone。看的第一个10分钟Gundotra 2010年的主题——整件事是关于超过iPhone。

格鲁伯既是对与错:是的,刚铎的言辞强烈anti-Apple,但是最终这一主题每个人都出席了HTC EVO 4 g; when it came to the zero-sum game of actually putting phones in people’s pockets, Apple’s competitors (then) were companies like HTC, Motorola, and especially SamsungGranted, those manufacturers’ phones ran Google’s Android software, but then again Google’s software ran on the iPhone, too; in fact, at the time of Gundotra’s speech, Google Maps, YouTube, and Google Search were all built into iOS.

我们知道今天不会这样长时间:两年后iOS 6倾倒YouTube应用程序,更著名,改变了默认的映射应用程序从一个基于谷歌苹果自己的。1近因并非Gundotra的演讲,虽然:事实上,苹果购买一个公司叫Placebase映射2009年,几个月后谷歌已经推出了逐向道路导航; it was Android-only.

谷歌与安卓

很少人知道到底是谁负责Google-Apple分手是的,史蒂夫·乔布斯是青灰色的,Android手机看起来很像iPhone,但请记住,谷歌Android两年前购买iPhone出来(和前一年埃里克•施密特加入苹果董事会)微软作为对冲; once the iPhone came out,为什么而骄傲你会建立一个电话有不同吗?

Where Google went wrong was with that maps decision: making turn-by-turn directions an Android-exclusive differentiated Android as a platform, but to what end? So that HTC et al could sell a few more phones, and pay Google nothing for the privilege?

事实是,谷歌和苹果赚钱时一点也没有竞争对手:苹果是一个垂直的公司的研发和资本投资设计和制造设备,包括重要的材料成本,然后出售这些设备对其他厂商的零和竞争是的,市场份额是非常重要的,但也是盈利能力:苹果交易达到整个市场有利于创建一个有区别的经验,客户将支付溢价,远远超过每个iPhone(重要)的边际成本。

与此同时,谷歌一直是一种完全不同的公司——一个水平几乎所有谷歌的成本是固定的——研发和数据中心——这意味着盈利能力与市场份额相辅相成,这通过扩展意味着广告是完美的商业模式越多越多的人使用谷歌,这些固定成本可以分散,和谷歌是广告商更有吸引力。

这就是为什么以任何方式偏爱Android都是谷歌这样的战略错误:关于公司的一切都是基于为所有客户提供服务,但Android的定义只会占智能手机的百分比。2再一次,有可能苹果会建立自己的地图产品无论如何,但是谷歌的目光短浅的支持Android确保数亿潜在谷歌用户默认映射经验和宝贵的数据,它将属于别人。

这是臭名昭著的刚铎演讲重要的地方:我不相信任何人在谷歌完全考虑支持Android的含义与他们的服务相反,Android的team was fully committed to competing with iOS — as they should have been! — and human nature ensured that the rest of Google came along for the rideRemember, given Google’s business model, winning marketshare was perfectly correlated with reaping outsized profits; it is easy to see how the thinking and culture that developed around Google’s core business failed to adjust to the zero-sum world of physical devices所以,作为例证,Gundotra演讲,Android赢得成为的代名词Google winning,而实际上Android是尽可能多的大毒蛇的资产。

谷歌的助理的问题

在昨天的主旨,谷歌CEO Sundar Pichai,科技历史的叙述后,强调了PC-Web-Mobile时代我描述在2014年末,3declared that we are moving from a mobile-first world to an AI-first one; that was the context for the introduction of the Google Assistant.

It was a year prior to the aforementioned iOS 6 that Apple first introduced the idea of an assistant in the guise of Siri; for the first time you could (theoretically) compute by voice它并不是很有效(可以说它仍然没有),但通常影响计算和谷歌特别深刻:语音交互都扩大了在哪里计算可以做,从情况下,你可以把你的眼睛和手你的设备有效地无处不在,即使它的限制什么你可以做An assistant has to be far more proactive than, for example, a search results page; it’s not enough to present possible answers: rather, an assistant needs to give the正确的回答。

This is a welcome shift for Google the technology; from the beginning the search engine has included an “I’m Feeling Lucky” button, so confident was Google founder Larry Page that the search engine could deliver you the exact result you wanted, and while yesterday’s Google Assistant demos were canned, the results, particularly when it came to contextual awareness, were far more impressive than the other assistants on the market更广泛地说,很少有人质疑谷歌在人工智能和机器学习方面是一个明确的领导者。

然而,一项业务不仅仅是技术,而且特别是在助理方面,谷歌有两个重大缺点首先,正如我解释了今年的谷歌I / O之后,该公司有一个进入市场的差距:助理只是有用如果他们是可用的,这对于数以百万计的iOS用户下载和使用一个单独的应用程序(或建筑的经验,比如Facebook,用户会愿意花大量的时间)。

其次,谷歌有一个商业模式的问题:“手气不错”按钮确保问题不会让谷歌的搜索任何钱。4毕竟,如果用户不必从搜索结果中进行选择,则所述用户也没有机会点击广告,从而选择Google在其广告商之间创建的竞赛的获胜者以供用户关注。5谷歌助理有相同的问题:广告去哪里?

谷歌的转变

昨天的公告从谷歌似乎旨在承担公司的正面挑战一个assistant-centric世界理由很充分表示了谷歌的助理本身:纯技术一直是谷歌的力量在市场上的基础。

Today’s world, though, is not one of (somewhat) standards-based browsers that treat every web page the same, creating the conditions for Google’s superior technology to become the door to the Internet; it is one of closed ecosystems centered around hardware or social networks, and having failed at the latter, Google is having a go at the formerTo put it more generously, Google has adopted Alan Kay’s maxim that “People who are really serious about software should make their own hardware.” To that end the company introduced multiple hardware devices, including a new phone, the previously-announced Google Home device, new Chromecasts, and a new VR headset不用说,都使它更容易使用谷歌服务的第三方比任何OEM,更不用说苹果的iPhone。

更有趣的是,谷歌还引入了一个新的商业模式:像素电话起价649美元,iPhone一样,虽然需要时间对谷歌实现规模和专业知识水平与苹果的利润率,事实毫无疑问是大幅度的内置有深刻的为公司的新发展方向。6

最吸引人的一点是,尽管如此,谷歌打算如何卖像素:谷歌的助理,至少在目前,独有的第一个真正的谷歌手机,提供差异化的体验,至少从理论上讲,保证金的证明。

这是一个策略,当然听起来很熟悉,提高的问题是否逐向道路导航灾难的重演是谷歌忘了他们是一个水平的公司,其商业模式是为了达到最大化,没有限制吗?

我不这么认为事实上,我认为这深远的战略转变源于思维深度的截然相反的hot-headedness Android的领导It is not that Google is artificially constraining its horizontal business model; it is that its business model is being constrained by the reality of a world where, as Pichai noted, artificial intelligence comes first世界上,你必须拥有交互点,而且没有广告的空间,呈现Google的分布和业务模型模拟都必须改变对公司的技术优势,脱颖而出。

In this respect Google is like the bizarro-Apple: the iPhone maker has the distribution channel and business model to make Siri the dominant assistant in its users’ lives, but there are open questions about its technology prowess when it comes to artificial intelligence specifically and services generally; moreover, efforts to improve are fundamentally stymied by the公司的device-centric文化组织结构

谷歌的文化和组织结构,同时,适应其旧的商业模式,将市场份额和盈利能力,并取得市场份额,产品开发的方法基于迭代和实验上的积极反馈回路,来自大量数据。

手机不能更多的不同:像素是什么,这意味着它必须是伟大的一天,和销售The first means an organizational structure that delivers on the promise of focused integration, not willy-nilly experimentation and iteration; the second means partnerships, and outbound marketing, and a whole bunch of other things that Google has traditionally not valuedIndeed, you could see the disconnect in yesterday’s presentation: while Pichai was extremely clear about the company’s new direction, the actual product demonstrations quickly devolved into droning technical mumbo-jumbo that never bothered to explain why users should care.

这就是为什么,就像苹果,我可以谷歌的战略思维和是的印象深刻,勇气面对这个新时代,虽然我有点悲观的前景:技术本身是不够的,唯一的难度比改变商业模式正在改变文化。

  1. 谷歌搜索还船作为默认,谷歌支付的代价的特权(↩︎]
  2. One could argue in Google’s defense that Android had the potential to wipe out the iPhone just like Windows wiped out the Mac; that, though, is一个完整的历史的误解(虽然是一个常见的)Many of us were confident in the iPhone’s market resilience even then [↩︎]
  3. 并在2015年进一步细化Facebook的时代(↩︎]
  4. 事实上,由于谷歌即时搜索结果,按钮不存在了(↩︎]
  5. ,进而表示,广告商没有机会建立一个潜在的客户关系使赢得广告拍卖价值远远超过单一事务可能造成,它总是使他们愿意支付的价格远远高于在附属的模型,可能在某些用例(助理↩︎]
  6. And no, the Nexus devices don’t count; they had neither the business model nor the infrastructure to suggest they were anything but what Google said they were: public reference devices that offered the idealized Android experience for enthusiasts for a relatively low price与Nexus手机像素推出与载体支持,顶级规格和价格来匹配唯一缺少的是一个数百万美元的广告,我想我们很快会听到的消息(↩︎]